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Abstract
This paper is written in the context of current debates about the extent to which business coalitions
are shaping the political agendas of the contemporary city. With a growing critique of the use of
North American frameworks as a basis for the interpretation of business politics in the British city,
we make a contribution towards the development of a more theoretically informed account of
capital’s involvement in local politics in Britain. Our research design takes analysis beyond the
confines of what we term a ‘state-centred perspective’ insofar as we focus on the political behaviour
of one key fraction of capital, property, in a range of urban areas in one political system, Scotland.
Through the first survey to be conducted in Scotland of the political activities of property agents, the
paper draws out conclusions about the extent to which new forms of neo-liberal urban governance
are serving to construct an environment within which contemporary property politics are being
played out. Our results point to a politically engaged fraction of capital but one which is largely
oblivious to the changes in governance taking place around them. In an effort to further under-
standing property politics, we conclude that more attention needs to be given to capital and its
trajectories. In calling for an epistemological shift towards a capital-centred perspective, we
conclude that an understanding of property politics might profitably draw upon both a rehabilitated
version of neo-Marxist frameworks and more recent institutional perspectives. q 2000 Elsevier
Science Ltd All rights reserved.
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CHAPTER 1
Business politics in the city
According to Offe (1985), the business community in capitalist societies is not subjected
to the same imperative to organise itself as a political force as other sections of the
community, particularly say, labour. In his reading, this is due to the intrinsically powerful
position which capital possesses in such societies, giving it unique access to the state. With
globalisation, this power has clearly increased. The ever present threat, that capital oper-
ates with a heightened degree of mobility and may at a moment chose to withdraw from
certain locations, is sufficient to ensure that state agendas privilege its interest without the
need for any explicit political lobbying. It is clear, nevertheless, that at various moments in
time and various locations, the business community does feel the need to organise itself
into particular political forms to articulate its views to the state. The circumstances under
which these moments arise, the institutional architecture through which the business
community articulates its concerns, and the actual practices of lobbying remain, however,
poorly researched. It is against this wider backdrop that this paper is situated.
Whilst the political activities of capital might occur across a range of scales, we focus
here on only one scale—that of the local state. Further, our interest is confined to those
local states most responsible for managing urban environments. By ‘business politics’ we
mean the negotiated and contested interfaces between elements of the business community
and the key institutions of urban governance. In this respect, our study encompasses both
policy and practice—the issues around which politicking occurs and the actual practice of
how such politicking takes place. Whilst considerable attention has been given to the new
forms of urban governance which have emerged over the past two decades—and espe-
cially the development of coalitions and partnerships between the state and the private
sector—much less attention has been paid to the ‘business politics’ which surround these
developments. By focusing on a case study of one fraction of capital, property, in a range
of urban locations in one setting, Scotland, we attempt to rectify this oversight and to add
to the limited literature which does exists on the formal political activities of capital in the
city.
In this opening chapter, we begin with a review of recent research on business politics in
the North American city and consider current debates challenging the extent to which the
key concepts in this literature are transferable to the British context. Studies of North
American cities offer by far the most developed accounts of business politics at the urban
level and, therefore, have been all too often taken as an entry point to the British scene. In
the second section of the chapter, we turn attention to recent work, which suggests that the
restructuring of the local state in United Kingdom is serving to construct a context within
which new interfaces between the state and capital are developing. Therein business
politics in the city has been located within an arena of state restructuring. How capital
is responding to these new interfaces remains unclear however. This omission is, we
contend, a most fundamental obstacle to understanding the nature of business political
activity. Whilst using this state-centred thesis as a context, it is towards a more substantial
understanding of the role of capital that the paper is devoted. To this end, the third section
of the chapter will set out the main research questions that interest us. Our focus on one
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sector, property, and its activities in a range of different cities within Scotland, marks this
paper out from previous work. In this and the final section of the chapter, consequently, we
will explain why we have adopted this particular approach. As a prelude to the main study,
we will finish with a review of the general sets of relations between the state and property
that one might expect to exist at a theoretical level.
1.1. Reflecting on differences between North American and British experiences of business
coalitions
Arguably, the most developed accounts of business politics in the city derive from
studies conducted in North America. Here, despite being almost twenty years old, the
concept of growth machines would seem to continue to exert enormous influence (Logan
and Molotch, 1987; Jonas and Wilson, 1999). Growth machines represent amalgams of
branches of the local state and fractions of local capital whom together operate to define
and implement development objectives for the city. With the transformation within the
local state from managerialist to entrepreneurial structures and strategies, the interests of
capital tend to be privileged in these alliances. Indeed, what makes growth machines so
unique is the central role the business community plays in actually forcing local politics
along certain lines (Harvey, 1989). Moreover, the spontaneous formation of the business
community into an organised political movement seems to be the primary driving force
behind the North American local political scene (Wood, 1993). Central to the study of the
politics of the business community in the North American city, therefore, is the analysis of
the evolving interfaces between the local state and those fractions of capital involved in the
local growth machine.
If the business community in North America has developed highly organised political
forms at the urban level, the question remains as to why. Cox and his co-workers (Cox and
Mair, 1988; Jonas, 1991, 1996; Cox, 1995; Wood, 1996) have argued that not only is the
spatiality of the North American state a factor (where more power is vested at the local
level) but so too is the spatiality of capital. The high degree of local dependence of
capital—experienced by say banks, utility companies, newspaper companies and property
developers—necessitates their active involvement in politics; heightened at a time when
globalisation, greater capital mobility, and the rise of inter-urban competition places their
interests under strain. For these authors, the extent to which capital is wedded to any
locality is significant, and it is precisely those businesses which have a high level of local
capital investment, local non-substitutable exchange relations, reliance on the local labour
market, strong local knowledge and high overall locational concentration in an area that
are most likely to form spontaneously into coalitions. When the context of these economic
relations are threatened, these key fractions of capital may be motivated, spontaneously, to
try collectively to harness the power of the local state (and other capital) to defend their
interests. As Cox and Mair (1988: 310) express it, “locally dependent firms engage in
collective strategies via business coalitions in order to realize their common interests in a
particular area, interests that are antagonistic to those of locally dependent firms in other
places”.
Across the last decade there has grown an appreciation that the nature of business
politics in British cities is radically different from that which prevails in North America.
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A number of studies which have attempted to compare the shape and form of urban
regimes in both settings have noted a number of key differences (Stone, 1989; Ward,
1997). At a much more advanced level, a number of more critical studies have sought
to delineate the problematic nature of applying concepts (such as ‘growth machines’,
‘local dependence’, and ‘urban entrepreneurialism’) with a US genealogy to UK cities
(Lloyd and Newlands, 1988; Harding, 1991, 1994; Axford and Pinch, 1994; Ward, 1996,
1997; Wood, 1996; Rogerson and Boyle, 1998). The difficulty of exporting concepts
beyond North America has only served to draw attention to the fact that they represent
‘grounded constructions’ (Ward, 1996). The consequence of this growing wariness of
universalising North American theoretical frameworks has been the creation of something
of a theoretical void in British studies. British geographers, it would seem, are currently
floundering around in an effort to create theory which will allow an understanding of the
specificities of the British case.
In this search, research has been taken in two principal directions. First, in contrast to
the North American experience, research in the British context has pointed to the apparent
lack of spontaneity in the formation of business coalitions. In seeking to understand the
limited capacity of capital to self-organise in British cities, research has focused on the
different characteristics of the business community in the two national settings. In
particular, recent studies have begun to employ the concept of local dependence to assess
the extent to which there are differences in the nature, structure and spatiality of capital in
Britain (Harding, 1991; Ward, 1997; Rogerson and Boyle, 1998). Through specific
illustrations, it has been concluded that the centralisation of capital in Britain makes it
less inclined to be involved in local coalitions (Axford and Pinch, 1994; Wood, 1996).
Importantly, this research marks out new and promising ground for future studies, in so far
as it points to the need for greater insight into the institutional landscape of British capital.
Clearly, there is more at stake here than arguments about local dependency, and a whole
range of work needs to be undertaken regarding the different characteristics of capital.
This will be an issue which we will return to at the end of this paper.
Up to now, however, in Britain most energy has been expended on research which looks
at differences in the structure and strategies of the state. Here too, a wide range of studies
has pointed to differences between North America and Britain. The centralisation of the
British state in comparison to the more devolved, local structures of the state which prevail
in North America, is normally taken to be the main point of departure. Further, the way in
which the central state has sought to transform local government in Britain over the past
two decades has been cited as being of critical importance, for these changes have served
to catapult the local state into new relationships with the business community. It is in the
shadow of these new relationships, it is argued, that a new breed of business politics can be
detected in the United Kingdom. Whilst the study of business politics in North America is
currently being understood in terms of the role of aggressive business coalitions in shaping
the trajectory of political practice, British literature is pointing to the need to locate the
study of business politics in the city within both the framework of a centrally directed
restructuring of the British local state, and the new interfaces with capital these changes
are bringing about. It is towards this argument that attention now turns.
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1.2. The rise of the post-Fordist local state and the morphology of business politics in
British cities
Drawing upon various strands of regulation theory, there now exists a well devel-
oped literature on the changing structures and practices marking the governance of
urban areas (and indeed rural areas) in the United Kingdom in the past two decades.
In trying to contextualise these changes against the background of wider restructuring
in capitalist production and consumption processes, and the changing institutional
forms of the state which regulate particular regimes of accumulation, regulation-
inspired accounts have the virtue of going beyond mere description. The attraction
of regulation theory, therefore, lies in its ability to relate recent trends in the British
local state to changes in the wider economy and larger issues related to central
government’s effort to pursue a new mode of regulation. Whilst the purpose of this
paper is certainly not to understand the contribution made by the local state in Scot-
land to the social and technical regulation of the Scottish economy in the late 1990s,
it is worthwhile considering briefly some of the main theses to derive from this
literature as they serve well to render contemporary local state trajectories in Scotland
more comprehensible.
Arguably, the most useful overview of the changing contribution made by the local state
to the wider apparatus regulating capitalist development in the United Kingdom is that
provided by Goodwin and Painter (1996). Defining the terms ‘local governance’,
‘regulation’, and ‘crises’ with great care, Goodwin and Painter argue that a flaw in
many earlier accounts of regulation theory was to assume that episodic periods, where
state regulation of economic development ‘worked’, were the norm. Crises periods, where
predominant modes of regulation and capitalist development are out of synchronisation, it
was assumed would always be resolved and new regulatory structures would stabilise
emerging regimes of accumulation at least for a time. In fact, there is no reason to expect
periods of harmony to dominate. It would seem more likely, indeed, that crises and not
stability ought to be the norm. Even if technocrats in any society possess understanding of
the types of regulatory structures and practices which might succeed in stabilising a
particular regime of accumulation, it is still unlikely that prevailing social and political
conditions would automatically support and facilitate the straightforward introduction of
these ‘solutions’.
One of the reasons that ‘stability’ and ‘harmony’ tend to be so ‘naturalised’ in
regulation-inspired accounts, however, is because the period of 1945 to the mid-1970s
happens to have been one time frame within which state regulation of the economy
succeeded in promoting sustained economic growth. As part of the Fordist–Keynesian
state, the local state during this period crystallised into a particular form and performed a
clearly identifiable role in the overall mode of regulation. In producing an ideal typical
account of the shape of the local state during this time period, Goodwin and Painter (1996)
argue that among the main features of the local state under the Fordist–Keynesian mode of
regulation were: the pre-eminence of locally elected councils in the centralised delivery of
services; the promotion of social democratic and wealth redistributive goals; the adher-
ence to technocratic and managerialist structures; the underwriting the mass consumption
norm required to sustain Fordist growth (provider of key aspects of the social wage and of
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services which could not profitably be provided by the private sector); and the shaping and
implementing of the planning system.
Of course, the role of the local state in the regulation of Fordism has steadily diminished
since the early 1970s with the demise of this particular regime of accumulation. Whilst
analysts invariably speak of the rise of a de-regulated, flexible, disorderly, reflexive
capitalist economy, what has come to replace the Fordist economic system is evidently
a matter of some debate (Jessop, 1990, 1995). It should come as no surprise, therefore, that
there is considerable disagreement about the extent to which a new mode of social and
technical regulation has emerged too and, moreover, the extent to which the local state has
been ascribed a new role in this regulatory apparatus. These reservations should not be
taken to mean that new local state structures and functions are not discernible across the
United Kingdom. Indeed, a number of decisive shifts in the role of the local state would
seem to be occurring (Goodwin and Painter, 1996). Nevertheless, there would seem to be a
geographical unevenness in terms of the degree of change. Further, whether the new
structures and strategies of the local state amount to what might be referred to as a new
role in an emerging regulatory system is highly debatable. For Peck and Tickell (1994), far
from making a partial contribution to a new regulatory system, many developments in the
local state in Britain might actually be serving to undermine the development of a stable
new regime of accumulation.
Using the same ideal typical framework through which they attempted to characterise
the structures and strategies of the Fordist local state, Goodwin and Painter (1996) provide
a useful summary of the main shifts occurring within the local state today. Over the past
two decades, the local government system in Britain has been transformed into one of local
governance. Central to this shift has been a change in the philosophy of the local state.
Instead of defining its role in terms of compensating or regulating the market economy, the
local state is increasingly defining its role in terms of enabling the market. Among the
many new developments that have taken place are: the growing importance of entrepre-
neurial and neo-liberal discourses, manifested most clearly in the commodification and
privatisation of local government services; the growing importance of market mechanisms
in the delivery of other services; the growing significance of local economic development
policies as a legitimate policy area allied to the belief that the private sector must be the
main broker of local development; and, perhaps above all else, the growing significance of
central government quangos, parachuted into localities to by-pass the locally elected state
as the agent of local governance in particular spheres.
A working hypothesis, which will be the subject of scrutiny in this paper, is that it is
impossible to understand the nature of business politics in the contemporary British city
without an appreciation of the manner in which recent transformations in urban govern-
ance are serving to catapult the state into new relationships with the business community.
And it is around these interfaces with the state that one might expect business politics to
concentrate. Certainly, this proposition has been at the heart of work done by Peck (1995)
and Peck and Tickell, 1995). Peck’s core thesis is that business barons are apparently being
provided with unique opportunities at present to participate in the shaping of the trajec-
tories of British cities. And this access to the political process has arisen as a consequence
of recent changes in central state strategy vis-a-vis local government.
According to Peck, the rising importance of local business in the governance of British
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cities reflects an attempt by central government to create new institutional spaces within
the city for capital to take advantage of. It is the pursuit by central government of new
forms of neo-liberal institutions at the local level that has radically altered the political
environment within which business interests can be represented; “the form of localism
which is currently being witnessed… is very much a centrally orchestrated localism. The
newly constructed local business elite exercise their influence in the main through locally
based agencies established by, or networks afforded legitimacy by, central government.”
(Peck, 1995: 40) As Peck notes, “the argument presented here is that ‘business interests’
are currently being mobilised, given their form and presented with their function by the
state” (Peck, 1995: 17).
In speaking of the new role local business barons seem to be playing, Peck (1995) points
to development of a plethora of organisations such as TECs, LECs and UDCs across the
1980s and 1990s. These organisations are particularly interesting in so far as they pursue a
deliberative strategy of incorporating only certain types of capital into the heart of city
governance. The traditional, corporatist-inclined business representative organisations
such as the CBI and Chambers of Commerce come to be replaced as the main representa-
tives by more entrepreneurial forms of capital. It is those maverick capital, the ‘wheelers
and dealers’ in places, that are now given privileged access to the political process. For
instance, they are now preparing inward investment strategies for localities, are drawing
up retraining programmes, and are deciding upon the particular types of property invest-
ments localities most require. As just one facet of the current metamorphosis of the local
state in Britain, the rise of the local quangocracy exemplifies how relations between the
state and the local business community in British cities are currently evolving. It will be a
task of this paper to assess the extent to which the entire package of change is serving to
construct a new set of business political activities in turn.
1.3. Research aims and the research approach
There has been a tendency amongst regulationist accounts to operate with a taken-for-
granted notion that business people will participate in the new institutional structures
which are forming. Insufficient work has been done examining the actual response of
the business community to the new opportunities for political involvement, which they
have been provided with. To quote Wood et al. (1998: 16) “as such, the frameworks tend
to pre-empt the origins and form of local business interests, the essential motivations for
business involvement, and the complex interplay with central government sponsored ‘pro-
business agendas’”. This conclusion has led North et al. (1999: 6) to argue that there exists
a need for an “examination of the processes whereby individual business people, as actors,
decide to become involved in these new institutions of urban management and the extent
to which they also create a common identity and collective business agenda to progress
through these new institutions”.
If indeed capital is less locally dependent in Britain, and if local dependence is a key
attribute explaining capital’s engagements in local business politics, then further analysis
is required to account for why certain factions of capital DO engage with the state at the
local level in Britain (and equally why some do not). A limited number of studies have
been undertaken in a bid to address this question. These include Cochrane et al.’s (1996)
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study of the business sector’s involvement in the Manchester Olympic bid, Imrie et al.‘s
(1995) study of local community responses to the Cardiff Bay development and UDC,
Axford and Pinch’s (1994) attempt to apply growth coalition theory to local development
strategies in southern England, and Rogerson and Boyle’s (1998) study of the role of
maverick capitals in the formulation of Glasgow Development Agency’s inward
investment strategies.
Despite these studies, the paucity of a developed analysis of the response of business
interests is in Wood et al.’s (1998) view still inhibiting greater theoretical understanding of
the role of business involvement in the management and regulation of British cities. In
turning to consider the conceptualisation of business interests and business interest forma-
tion in greater detail than hitherto, they mark out important new ground. Here, we wish to
suggest a different path towards a similar goal; that of a more theoretically informed
understanding of business involvement. Alongside theoretical reflection, we contend
that understanding of the circumstances under which the business community does
become politicised in British cities must also derive from more detailed case studies.
We will present an empirical analysis of the political activities of leading property capitals
within the major cities of Scotland in the spring of 1998. In so doing, we hope to further
understanding of the kinds of responses this particular cohort of capitals are making to the
raft of new state/property interfaces which are being created against the backdrop of the
rise of more neo-liberal forms of urban governance.
In looking at how property mobilising agents have been politically active across a range
of Scottish cities, we hope to foreground the importance of opening up analytic frame-
works to the significance of beginning with capital. In particular, the freeing up of analyses
from state-centred approaches offers opportunities for new research designs to be consid-
ered. There are, here, two ways in which the design of our study differs from the limited
amount of work that has been carried out to date on the political activities of the business
community in British cities. First, we choose to focus upon the political activities of
capital in one sector only, property, and indeed our more specific interests lie with a
selective group of actors within this sector, which we define as property mobilising agents.
This is unique in so far as the majority of work done to date has tended to look at particular
business clubs which have developed directly in response to state agendas. These business
clubs tend, further, to involve a range of different capitals.
The predominance of studies of the public–private partnership type in our view presents
a very narrow entry point. We interpret the interest in this work as deriving in part as a
consequence of the desire of analysts to endeavour to find ‘growth coalitions’ of the North
American variety in British cities. However, perhaps more importantly, this interest
represents an epistemological position that reflects the state-centred thesis outlined
above. That is, the analytic horizon is limited by the assumption that business political
activities take place only within the shadow of the new neo-liberal forms of local govern-
ance. Furthermore, the only capitals that are examined are those that do participate (but see
Imrie et al., 1995).
To be sure, our research itself attempts to ascertain the importance of new state struc-
tures in actually shaping business political activities. Our starting point, however, is one
step removed from the state and begins with capital itself. By examining a range of
companies who may or may not be involved in public–private partnerships, we hope to
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avoid the epistemological trap set by state-centred analysis. Our research design, there-
fore, reflects a more general interest in shifting the analytic basis of work in this area away
from approaches which begin and end with the state, towards perspectives which, whilst
using the state as an essential backdrop, nevertheless focus on the business community
itself. In choosing to focus on one economic sector, we recognise that this too represents an
imperfect starting point. We operate on the assumption that capitals in different sectors can
be expected to generate different interfaces with the state because of their position within
the overall capitalist system and therefore different sets of business political activities.
This is not to suggest that all sectors are homogeneous. It is nevertheless to acknowledge
that there can be expected to be greater intra-sectoral similarities than exist between
different sectors of capital.
A second way in which our study differs from existing work is the fact that we have
chosen to look at the political activities of companies across a number of cities. To date,
analyses of business politics in the British city have tended to focus upon single city case
studies. In some instances, a range of cities have been included, but this most often
represents an attempt to compare discrete case studies rather than to examine how
individual companies politic across the urban hierarchy. Again, this focus on single
cities would appear to reflect both the need for analysts to find North American type
growth coalitions in British cities, and the epistemological stranglehold which the state-
centred view has in this area.
Our decision to focus upon Scotland relates in principle to the unique structure of the
Scottish state system. In Chapter 2, we will demonstrate how the old Scottish Office model
served to distinguish the Scottish political scene from its Westminster counterpart. With
the existence of a distinctive state system which is serving to mediate how the national
transfer of urban governance from Fordism to Post-Fordism is grounding itself specifically
in Scotland, it makes theoretical sense to undertake analysis at this geographical scale.
Moreover, the study took place in early 1998, well before the new Parliament was estab-
lished (July 1999). We see our study as providing a useful benchmark for future work. It
would, for instance, be fascinating to repeat this study to assess whether the political
activities of property mobilising agents in urban Scotland have changed under the new
constitutional circumstances.
Having outlined the novel aspects of the approach we have taken, it is now possible to
specify the more immediate aims of the research project. By means of the first ever survey
of the political behaviour of the largest property mobilising agents in Scotland, we set out
to:
(a) assess the degree to which property mobilising agents are politically active in Scot-
land, gauging the importance of local level activity in relation to political activity at
higher levels of government;
(b) examine the main channels through which property mobilising agents articulate their
concerns to the state;
(c) ascertain whether there are any differences in the lobbying behaviour of different
types of property mobilising agents;
(d) assess whether the recent shifts in the structures and strategies of urban governance
have created new sites of political lobbying.
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1.4. The focus on the property sector
We have now outlined the broad approach we have taken to the topic and our principal
research goals. Before we map out the structure of the remaining chapters, we wish to
explain why we haven chosen to focus on the property sector. Our decision to look at
property derives in part from the observation that property developers seem to be highly
politicised in other parts of the world. For some commentators, this is to be explained by
the fact that property typifies that type of capital that has been viewed as locally depen-
dent. With its spatial immobility and tendency to economic illiquidity, property capital
meets the conditions of local dependence which Cox and Mair (1988) argue to be so
important. As noted already, the lack of such locally dependent capital in the United
Kingdom, however, would appear to render this argument less relevant. Such a reading
would be a mistake. It remains of interest to ascertain just how politically active this
fraction of capital is even if it is not fully locally dependent.
Our decision to focus upon property politics derives, however, principally from our
belief that there exists a raft on interfaces between the state and property sector and, as
such, a study of property politics has the potential of allowing a variety of issues to be
addressed which would be invisible if other sectors had been chosen. Partly because of the
central role property plays in relation to the wider capitalist system (for example its
capacity to cut across the various circuits of capital (Harvey, 1982, 1985)) there exist
more areas of overlap between the property sector and the state than would be the case in
other sectors, and certainly therefore more potential for conflict, friction, and political
activity. There are surely few sectors that offer the same scope of coverage of potential
patterns of business politics than property.
Drawing from a wide review of the literature, we wish to end this chapter by proposing a
typology of possible state–property relationships in an effort to define the sets of interfaces
which might be most significant in shaping property politics. Table 1 is offered as a
heuristic tool to be referred to in the remainder of this paper. The table proposes the
existence of five main categories of state/property relations, and in particular offers a
12-fold typology of the roles enacted by the state, which impinge on the property market.
Clearly the nature of each interface will vary through time. For instance, one would expect
the property development process to vary under different regimes of accumulation and
therefore to set property into new relations with the state. Further, as noted above, as the
state moves beyond its old Fordist–Keynesian structures and practices, one might expect
the postures of the state to change, and old interfaces to metamorphose into different
forms. The table is, therefore, pitched at a fairly abstract level, and surpasses the particular
nature of interfaces produced under certain regimes of accumulation and associated modes
of regulation. Further, not all the relationships cited are of immediate relevance to the local
level and therefore to this paper. In the next chapter, an effort will be made to examine
those interfaces, which are of particular relevance to the agents of urban governance in
Scotland. The table serves, however, as a useful device for contextualising local state/
property interfaces within the wider context of all state/property interfaces.
1.5. Structure of the paper
The overall aim of this paper then is to use a case study of the political activities of
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property mobilising agents in urban Scotland to further understanding of business politics
in the city more generally. In focusing upon the political activities of capital within the
property sector, and tracking behaviour across the Scottish urban hierarchy, this paper
proposes a different approach from existing studies which have tended to focus upon the
growth of public–private partnerships around the new institutions of urban governance.
Whilst concerned with the extent to which the rise of post-Fordist forms of urban govern-
ance is serving to give shape to a new breed of property politics in the city, our decision to
focus upon a sector-based approach represents an attempt to bring capital back into the
centre of the equation.
The remainder of the paper is constructed around four chapters. First, in Chapter 2 we
seek to isolate from Table 1 the state/property interfaces which are of greatest relevance in
urban Scotland, and attempt to identify the ways in which the rise of post-Fordist forms of
urban governance is active in reshaping the nature of these interfaces. This provides a
context within which the third research question raised above, in particular, can be
addressed. Given that ours is the first major survey of the political activities of mobilising
agents to have been undertaken, in Chapter 3 we outline the principle methodological
issues with which the study has had to contend. In Chapter 4 we then seek to profile those
mobilising agents who make up our sample, and progress to a presentation of the core
empirical results which have been produced. In particular, this chapter will seek to address
the four research aims noted above. Finally, in Chapter 5, we will reflect upon the contri-
butions which the paper has made and outline what we perceive to be the key theoretical
directions for future research.
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Table 1
Key interfaces between the state and property market
Structures of governance
Constitutional and legislative arrangements (e.g. devolution, quangos)
Direct intervention in market
Subsidies and regional partnerships (e.g. Regional Selective Assistance, lottery funds)
Land and property ownership by the state
Occupier and tenant
Indirect market intervention
State investment in infrastructure (e.g. transport policy, environmental improvements)
Investment strategies (e.g. market intelligence, inward investment agencies)
Regulating property market operations
Fiscal policies (e.g. interest rates, monetary policy)
Protection of private property (e.g. police, fire, army)
Regulation of legal system of the property market (e.g. land and property ownership rights)
Legislation on design and land-use planning (e.g. green belt policy, development controls)
Ideological stance
Place marketing and external postures (e.g. hallmark events, cultural festivals)
Political culture and internal attitudes (e.g. bureaucracy, attitudes to development)
CHAPTER 2
State/property interfaces and changing trajectories of urban governance in Scotland
In the previous chapter, it was argued that the way in which the British economy has
been governed these past two decades has undergone transformation, as the rise to
prominence of neo-liberal agendas has sought to transform the dominant mode of
regulation based upon Keynesian demand management and the principle of the welfare
state. We have noted that the question of the extent to which emerging new structures and
strategies have served to steer the British state into new relationships with the business
community has been raised. In turn, we have posited a further question as to whether
recent changes have served to construct an environment within which a new breed of
business politics might have developed. Prior to searching for an answer to these questions
in the context of the property sector in urban Scotland, in this chapter we turn attention to
the changing shape of urban governance in Scotland. In repositioning itself in new ways in
relation to the business community, we are interested in assessing the extent to which the
local state is now casting itself into a new trajectory in relation to the property sector
specifically.
From our general typology of the key interfaces between the state and the property
market portrayed in Table 1, we wish here to isolate out a number of the principal ways in
which the local state in particular engages with the property sector. Further we wish to
reflect upon ways in which the rise of post-Fordist forms of governance in urban Scotland
is actively (or not, as the case may be) reshaping such local interfaces. We examine four of
the five main categories identified in Table 1, covering a total of seven interfaces: the
structures of governance (the rise of quangos); direct state intervention in property markets
(including subsidies, the state as provider of property for the private sector, and as tenant/
occupier); indirect state intervention in property markets (infrastructure investment and
investment strategies); and the state as a regulator (specifically under the local planning
system). In focussing on only seven interfaces we do not wish to suggest that the remainder
have no importance; only that in the local context their immediate relevance is more
questionable.
Table 2 depicts the main (ideal typical) changes which might be expected in terms of
these state/property interfaces as the local state evolves under the post-Fordist agenda. Of
course, to the extent that the very concept of a post-Fordist form of governance has validity
in the first instance, we bear in mind the idea that transformation is an ongoing process and
is occurring unevenly across the country. It is hoped that by highlighting how a number of
key interfaces between the local state and the property sector are currently changing in
urban Scotland, we will be in a better position to address the third research aim outlined in
the previous chapter; namely, how property mobilising agents are responding to the new
agendas for urban governance. The primary purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to provide
the essential context required for the analysis of the policy areas around which property
politics is occurring in Scotland.
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2.1. Changing structures of governance in urban Scotland
For the benefit of readers unfamiliar with the Scottish scene, we start by contextualising
the various structures of urban governance in Scotland within the wider Scottish state.
Whilst many commentators have tended to represent the United Kingdom as a unitary
state, it is more accurate to describe the constitutional arrangements which existed in 1998
as comprising a ‘union state’ (Mitchell, 1997). Whilst the union state is not federal, it is
characterised, nevertheless, by the presence of different institutional structures in different
parts of the country and often a degree of devolution of power from the centre. At the heart
of the Scottish arm of the United Kingdom state is the Scottish Office. The Scottish Office
is exclusively funded by Westminster in the form of a block grant, which in the 1997–
1998 financial year amounted to £14 384 million or approximately 28% of Scotland’s
GDP (Scottish Office, 1998a).
Prior to the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in July 1999, Scotland’s interests
have been represented at cabinet by the Secretary of State for Scotland whose responsi-
bility has been to oversee the activities of the Scottish Office. At the time of writing (May
1999), this post has the same status as any other Minister responsible for a non-territorial
or functional government department. Consequently, the Scottish Office is constrained and
ultimately subordinate to the British Parliament at Westminster. The degree of influence it
has “depends upon the issue, its political salience, the strength of the argument mustered,
and the relative power of its ministers in government” (Mitchell, 1997: 409). Beyond
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Direct intervention
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Significant public funding of
hard infrastructure
Strategic state funding of soft
infrastructure for economic
growth




Regulating property market operations
Legislation on design and
land-use planning
Comprehensive development
planning and land-use controls
Pro-development and laissez
faire planning
Central Services, the Scottish Office consists of five main Departments: the Scottish Office
Agriculture, Environment and Fisheries Department (SOAEFD); the Scottish Office
Development Department (SODD); the Scottish Office Education and Industry Depart-
ment (SOEID); the Scottish Office Department of Health (SODoH); and the Scottish
Office Home Department (SOHD).
Each of these departments in turn has many sub-divisions, including a number of
Executive Agencies. Further, many of these sub-divisions and agencies are organised
on a territorial basis, with varying degrees of autonomy from the centre. It is this battery
of organisations and local offices which forms the backbone of the apparatus which
governs the Scottish city. In the context of this study, our interest lies in the functions
and responsibilities of two departments in particular; SODD and SOEID. Fig. 1 depicts the
internal sub-divisions and Executive Agencies which fall under the control of these two
departments.
The remit of the SODD is to administer a wide range of government policies related to
housing and area regeneration, links with the EU—including the co-ordination of
Structural Fund programmes (over 85% of the Scottish population is covered by
Objectives 1, 2, 3, and 5b)—roads and transport, the built heritage, and, most significantly,
local government organisation and finance, and land use planning and building control.
The current structure of local government was established by the Local Government etc
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Fig. 1. Key aspects of the structure of Scottish office.
(Scotland) Act 1994 and came into effect on 1 April 1996. The structure consists of 29
single-tier councils—replacing the 53 District and 9 Regional Councils established in
1975—and 3 Islands Councils (Fig. 2). The 32 councils are responsible for all services
administered by their predecessors so that executive authority therefore now lies with
single tiers of local government. Given our interest in urban Scotland, and based upon
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Fig. 2. Unitary authorities in Scotland.
population density figures for each local government area from the data available from
General Registrar Office (Scotland), the most urbanised local government units in Scot-
land are, in descending order, Glasgow, Dundee, Edinburgh, Aberdeen City, North
Lanarkshire, and Renfrewshire.
In the literature reviewed above, it was argued that a defining feature of the Fordist
mode of regulation was the pre-eminence of democratically elected local governments.
The fact that the bulk of the SODD’s expenditure of £4280 million in the 1997/1998
financial year was on the local government system (Scottish Office, 1998a: 173–174)
would appear to be testimony to the fact that it remains a crucial player in urban Scotland.
Whilst this observation cannot be overlooked, it would, however, be folly to ignore the
increasing role which is being played by quango bodies, under the responsibility other sub-
divisions of the SODD and, indeed, of other departments. Such quangos embody the core
dimensions of urban governance within the post-Fordist model (Table 2).
The key quango body which will be considered in this paper is Scottish Enterprise and
its associated network of Local Enterprise Companies (LECs). Of the £1945 million spent
through the SOEID in 1997/98, nearly £450 million was spent upon the Scottish Enterprise
Network (Scottish Office, 1998a: 173–174). Scottish Enterprise’s sister organisation,
Highlands and Island’s Enterprise, is responsible for the most rural and remoter parts of
Northern Scotland and thus will not be considered further here. Scottish Enterprise
emerged in 1991 as a replacement of the older Scottish Development Agency. As such,
it has assumed the role of Scotland’s leading economic development organisation.
Macleod (1998) has been at the forefront of theorising the rise of Scottish Enterprise as
an attempt by the Conservative government to establish a private sector-led, entrepreneur-
ial national development agency in place of the more interventionist and Labour-inspired
Scottish Development Agency model. As such, Scottish Enterprise can be read as an icon
of the wider shift away from the Fordist–Keynesian compromise reported upon above.
With Scottish Enterprise came an ideological shift towards privatism, and the role of the
state was redefined to be that of enabling and lubricating the private sector.
In recognition of the different economic problems experienced by different areas of
Scotland, Scottish Enterprise established a network of 13 Local Enterprise Companies
(Fig. 3). With a few relatively minor exceptions, LEC areas overlap with specific
combinations of local government areas and this should be borne in mind in the remainder
of this paper. LECs function as private companies and are contracted by Scottish
Enterprise to undertake specific local economic development tasks. Embedded within
this relationship is a separation of the LEC from Scottish Enterprise, its location in a
quasi-market, and its operation as a performance driven entity. This also means that the
LECs have some autonomy to derive policy agendas of their own and, indeed, in some
areas it is the LECs rather than Scottish Enterprise whom are responsible for devising and
implementing new programmes and initiatives.
In the 1997–1998 financial year, Scottish Enterprise operated with a total budget of
£449 million (Scottish Enterprise, 1998: 7). Table 3 indicates the division of expenditure
across the 13 LECs. In terms of areas of activity, LECs are specifically contracted by
Scottish Enterprise to improve business competitiveness (consuming £51 million of the
£449 million for 1997–1998), to improve business start up rates (£25 million), to
encourage inward investment (£11 million), to improve exports (£13 million), to provide
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Fig. 3. Local enterprise companies areas.
training (£128 million), to provide physical business infrastructure (£113 million), and to
enhance social inclusion (£41 million) (Scottish Enterprise, 1998: 6).
As the key institution behind the local economic development of Scottish cities, and as
icons of the new post-Fordist state, LECs have served to generate a myriad of new state/
property interfaces. The most important of these will be outlined below. First, it is essential
to note that, with the rise of LECs, the capacity of the private sector to gain decision-
making power has increased. LECs are controlled principally by private sector boards,
which are, in part, selected by the Secretary of State for Scotland, but also recruited by a
process of self-selection. In line with the Thatcherite ethic of empowering local business
elites, and in particular recruiting local mavericks with entrepreneurial flair and drive onto
key structures of urban governance, LECs are governed by key figures in the local business
community (Hayton, 1992; Peck, 1995; Macleod, 1998). In consequence, from the
perspective of the property sector, the LECs represent sites of power over which they
might have direct influence. To the extent that leading property players are in the ‘in
circle’ in their respective cities, they have an opportunity not just of having their voices
heard by sympathetic ears, but also of actually taking a seat at the heart of power
themselves.
At one level, these local enterprise bodies are taking key governance roles out of the
provenance of the democratic local state. Further, their importance is increasingly being
supported by the local state itself, which now appears to recognise that it is only through
forming coalitions with a range of partners, including LECs, that they can hope to build
sufficient capacity to make a difference to life in Scottish cities. Such coalitions may offer
the opportunity for some democratic accountability to be imposed on these quangos. One
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Table 3
Scottish Enterprise expenditure 1997–1998 (Source: Scottish Enterprise, 1998: 7)
Expenditure (£)
Local Enterprise Companies
Glasgow Development Agency 56 million
Lanarkshire Development Agency 51 million
Fife Enterprise 39 million
Lothian and Edinburgh Enterprise 36 million
Ayrshire Enterprise 26 million
Renfrewshire Enterprise 25 million
Scottish Enterprise Tayside 24 million
Forth Valley Enterprise 22 million
Grampian Enterprise 21 million
Dunbartonshire Enterprise 16 million
Dumfries and Galloway Enterprise 10 million
Scottish Borders Enterprise 8 million
Moray/Badenoch/Strathspey Enterprise 2 million
Scottish Enterprise Network
Scottish Enterprise Central 77 million
Training Allowances 36 million
Total 449 million
example of this shift in attitude within the democratic local state can be witnessed in the
Glasgow Alliance organisation. This umbrella organisation, which includes representa-
tives from Scottish Homes, Glasgow Development Agency, and Greater Glasgow Health
Board, is chaired by the local council and now claims to be the central ‘driver’ behind the
city. It is currently attempting to formulate a plan for the city, which will give a sense of
coherence and steerage to the action programmes of the major public bodies in the city,
and to avoid duplication of effort and conflict of interests. Glasgow Alliance, although
only currently finding its feet, is widely recognised by the movers and shakers in the city to
bear witness to the growing recognition that local governments in Scotland are now
willing to open up their decision-making structures and to embrace the local quangocracy
in order to build capacity.
2.2. Direct intervention in the property market
Beyond changes in the actual structures of governance, there have been important shifts
in the practices of governance. Amongst the most significant have been shifts in the ways
in which the state directly intervenes in property markets. The literature would suggest that
with the rise of post-Fordism greater emphasis should be placed on the role of the private
sector in the provision of property. Certainly evidence in urban Scotland suggests that the
local state is privatising its property holdings, and is at most intervening only in the market
at times of failure. In terms of the provision of commercial property the main role of the
state is to lever private investment. Further, the state is now relying on the private sector to
provide the infrastructure it itself requires as part of its remit as a service provider.
2.2.1. Privatisation of property holdings and the turn to pump priming
Whilst the Scottish Development Agency played a central role as a provider of commer-
cial property during its existence from 1975 to 1991, local authorities too have historically
played a significant role. Whether it be in terms of the construction of industrial estates, the
provision of offices for commercial renting or the ownership of vast tracks of retail outlets,
local authorities in urban Scotland have historically made fairly heavy capital injections to
improve the built environment for local economic development. Such intervention has
been undertaken in the belief that it is the state’s responsibility to ensure that the property
requirements of an expanding economy are met. Not only has the private sector not been
encouraged to develop, but on some occasions the operation of the private market has
actually been crowded out by public sector property development.
Probably from as early as the mid-1980s, and certainly following the birth of Scottish
Enterprise, there has been a decisive shift away from this position. Certainly at a time
when local authorities are seeking to enlist the help of the of the private sector to meet their
own needs (through the Private Finance Initiative), it is not surprising that they are also
turning towards the private sector to create suitable built environments for economic
development. At one level, this transition is witnessed in the privatisation of public
property. Whilst New Town Development Corporations and Scottish Enterprise have
led the way in terms of the privatisation of large sections of their property portfolio,
local authorities have not been far behind, and have sought, whenever possible, to offer
selective property holdings to private interests. At another level, however, and in
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recognition that the operation of the private market might require some lubrication, there
has grown a more strategic form of public sector intervention, which seeks to lever private
investment. As evidenced in the role of Glasgow City Council in attracting property
capital into the merchant city area of Glasgow in the 1980s, or more recently the role
of the state in the construction of the new South Gyle shopping centre in Edinburgh, local
government still does continue to play a part in public efforts to stimulate the private
market.
It is, nevertheless, in the activities of the LECs that pump-priming of the private
property sector is most evident. The LECs normally only involve themselves in property
development in circumstances of market failure and where there is a significant strategic
benefit. Even then, this involvement is overwhelmingly on a partnership basis with the
private sector. For instance, LECs may reclaim land, decontaminate land, and provide
certain site assembly functions, only if the private sector will take responsibility for its
development. The bulk of the £113 million spent across the Scottish Enterprise Network
on physical business infrastructure in the 1997/1998 financial year was to this end.
The transformation in urban governance from state provision of property to the
privatisation of property and the increasing significance of public sector leverage of
private investment is clearly serving to create new types of relationships between the
state and the property sector. To argue that the governance of urban Scotland is now
driven by the fundamental goal of liberating and lubricating the property market, however,
would be to stretch the argument too far. It would seem that the workings of the property
market are generating concerns for the state and that, in many instances, such concerns are
demanding roles more akin to older forms of market regulation and intervention. Market
failure means more in this context than merely the lack of provision of property in relation
to the needs of the local economy. It might alternatively be conceived, as the failure of the
market to deliver the kinds of property developments demanded by local state officials. As
such, the state is driven to shape development to bring it into line with state agendas.
In some respects, it is the presence of uneven development across the Scottish LECs and
indeed within the Scottish LECs which is causing greatest concern. Conclusions drawn
from two recent official reports point to an increasing concern about the geography of LEC
involvement in pump priming. First, at the national level, EKOS (1998) recently published
a Scottish Enterprise commissioned report examining the provision of advance factories
for inward investors in Scotland. This report argued that four types of LEC area exist in
Scotland. Type A LECs (Lothian and Edinburgh Enterprise, Lanarkshire Development
Agency, and Fife Enterprise) are locations of large amounts of diverse inward investments
and have a vigorous private property market leading to relatively large reserves of advance
factories. Type B LECs (Moray, Badenoch & Strathspey, Scottish Borders Enterprise, and
Dumfries & Galloway Enterprise) are, in contrast, largely rural in character, with very low
levels on inward investment and a negligible private property market. Although having
few reserves of advance factories, these areas would appear to have few requirements for
such property. Type C LECs (Forth Valley Enterprise, Dunbartonshire Enterprise,
Renfrewshire Enterprise, Ayrshire Enterprise, and Scottish Enterprise Tayside) are
locations which have seen a modest amount of inward investment, including a small
number of large projects, but which suffer from a relatively weak property market.
They are in need of advance factory provision. Finally, Type D LECs (Glasgow
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Development Agency and Grampian Enterprise) are locations with high levels of very
specific types of inward investment (financial services in Glasgow, energy in Aberdeen).
Whilst Aberdeen will continue to rely on the energy sector, and will continue to be
relatively well endowed with the necessary advance factory spaces, Glasgow is seeking
to become a Type A LEC and does require to augment its existing ‘strategic sites strategy’
with another phase of new site development which might make it better equipped to
receive a greater variety of inward investments.
In commissioning the report, Scottish Enterprise specifically requested advice on how a
more integrated approach to advance factory provision could be co-ordinated across
Scotland. To this end, EKOS recommended that cognisance be given to the above fourfold
typology, with strategic pump-priming initiatives being devoted to areas of greatest need.
For instance, LECs should only enter into public–private partnerships in areas with less
that three years existing supply of advance factories and where there is clear evidence of
market failure. It is clearly debatable whether LECs will be prepared to take such a
national strategy on board, but what this EKOS report does illustrate is that coping with
the uneven geography of the existing demand and supply base is on the Scottish Enterprise
agenda.
Second, at a more local scale, Ryden (1998) published a report examining trends in
office development and location in Scotland. The specific remit of the report was to
examine whether new trends in office location were occurring across Scotland in the
light of the revisions to the ‘Use Classes Order’ permitting office development on land
zoned for industrial development which took effect in 1989. The concern was that this
change in planning policy had triggered out of town office developments in business parks
surrounding settlements. The report noted that whilst not occurring to the same degree as
in England, Scotland was witnessing a drift of new office developments to out of town
locations, particularly in the old Lothian and Central regions. Further, “continued devel-
opment in off-centre locations….will leave behind a growing urban regeneration challenge
in the form of obsolete offices, particularly those of 1960s/1970s vintage” (Ryden, 1998:
37). Given government policy towards regenerating the city, developing brownfield sites,
and producing more sustainable transport plans, the report recommended that “public
sector authorities in relevant areas should be encouraged to consider mechanisms,
including compulsory purchase, selective financial assistance, and site assembly (with
associated infrastructure), whereby in-town office development opportunities could be
created to match those out of town” (Ryden, 1998: 37). Once again, LEC intervention
is being encouraged in a spatially specific way. The aim may be to lubricate the market,
but lubrication is being undertaken within a specific political context.
2.2.2. From property owner to tenant
Aside from changing its role in the provision of property, the local state is also under-
going a metamorphosis from property owner to tenant. Indeed, perhaps the most recent
and most significant example of how the post-Fordist local state is ushering in new state/
property interfaces is the growing significance of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI). The
PFI was launched by the British Government in November 1992 with the basic goal of
increasing the role of the private sector in the provision of the infrastructure required by
public services (Gallimore et al., 1997). Despite its somewhat stuttering start, and the
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change in government from Conservative to Labour, it remains at the forefront of current
government policy. Indeed, it emerged as a major political football in the run up to the
Scottish Parliament with the Scottish Nationalist Party threatening to abandon it if they got
to power. Although some senior figures in the Scottish Labour Party are against the
concept, it is likely to remain a key and active policy for the foreseeable future.
Against the backdrop of an increasingly run-down public sector capital stock, further
predicted decreases in feasible public sector capital expenditure, and the prevalence of a
climate of privatisation within the public sector, the PFI represents the preferred route of
financing better buildings for the provision of public services. In essence, the private sector
is being invited to take over the construction and maintenance of new hospitals, education
establishments, airport buildings and so on. In so doing, the private sector takes on the
risks which the public sector would otherwise have to carry (site acquisition risk, planning
approval risk, design risk, construction risk, maintenance and facility management risk,
occupation-demand risk, obsolescence risk and residual value risk). The public sector,
meanwhile, assumes the more risk aversive, but perhaps also least profitable, role of sitting
tenant for an agreed period of time.
Whilst the PFI remains at a very early stage, it is clear that the UK government has
grandiose ambitions for it. According to the government, there exist over 1000 possible
PFI projects across the UK with a capital value of £25 billion, and estimated cumulative
service costs of £40–60 million (present value) (Gallimore et al., 1997). According to
figures from the Scottish Office (personal communication 26 October 1998) a total of 11
projects have already been completed (capital value of £56.9 million), 14 projects have
already been signed (estimated capital value of £737.5 million), 19 projects have issued
tenders or at the negotiation stage (estimated capital value £727.1 million), 3 are currently
being advertised (estimated capital value of £17.7 million) and 12 projects have been
designated as having PFI potential (estimated capital value of £712.5 million). Further, the
current and proposed PFI would seem to have a widespread geography with all major
urban centres having an interest. For example, the location of projects, which have been
completed or signed to date, include Glasgow, Edinburgh, Aberdeen and Dundee, as well
as Perth, Law, Falkirk and Inverness. PFI would seem to be an issue, which is touching the
built environment of all major conurbations in Scotland. To the extent that the PFI will
develop into the major vehicle for the delivery of public sector infrastructure, it clearly has
the potential to shape the context within which local governments operate. Particularly,
local governments, a major consumer of public sector infrastructure, will be required to
develop whole new ways of relating to the property sector as a tenant or customer.
2.3. Indirect intervention in the property market
Broad local economic development strategies pursued at the local level also have served
to cast agents of urban governance into new relationships with property companies. In this
context, our interest lies in those general strategies that attempt to improve the economic
environment within which property companies operate and, as such, impinge upon the
fortunes of these companies in an indirect way. Certainly there has been a marked growth
in the significance given to local development initiatives by local governments in Scot-
land. Particularly, it would appear to be in the area of upgrading the environment and
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image of cities to attract inward investment and tourists that local government is most
active. Glasgow is clearly one city which has vigorously embraced the place-marketing
ethos. Through campaigns such as Glasgow’s Miles Better, the Glasgow Garden Festival
1988, the European City of Culture event 1990 and, more recently, the British City of
Architecture and Design 1999 celebrations, Glasgow has attempted to upgrade its soft
infrastructure in order to stimulate economic regeneration. Beyond Glasgow, most of the
other main urban centres in Scotland have followed suite. Whether it be in terms of
Edinburgh’s new look Summer Festival or its Hogmanay Party, Aberdeen’s hosting of
the Tall Ships event, Dundee’s parading as City of Discovery, Perth’s claim to be the Fair
City, or the various television promotions pursued by Cumbernauld, East Kilbride, and
North Lanarkshire, it is clear that place marketing and civic boosterism have been central
devices used by local governments in Scotland across the past two decades. And, it is also
clear that perhaps more than any other business category beyond tourism, property devel-
opers have benefited most from this new area of state activity, and have the greatest stake
in it.
Whilst the relatively small amounts spent through local government on local economic
development projects forbid one from speaking about the much lauded transformation
from urban managerialism to urban entrepreneurialism (Boyle and Hughes, 1994; Wood,
1998), it would be a mistake to ignore the increase in activity in this area. Nevertheless,
local economic development initiatives are more clearly the provenance of LECs in urban
Scotland. Through a variety of interventions in the general economic environment within
which property companies are operating, LECs are serving to exert important influences
on their degree of success. Two examples can be cited here. First, without question one of
the most significant functions performed by LECs is that of training and re-training the
local labour force. As noted above, across the Enterprise network, this role accounts for a
major share of total expenditure. For property companies, this role is significant for two
reasons. First, it plays a part in helping companies (both indigenous and inward investors)
grow and therefore develop greater property needs. Second, given that some of the quali-
fications on offer are in the building trade or entail more generic skill acquisitions like IT
skills, property companies have something to gain from this area of LEC activity.
A second area in which LECs impact upon the property market in a general way is
through their inward investment strategies for cities. With primary responsibility for
devising inward investment strategies for their area, LECs have an influence on the
structure of property requirements within the city and thus upon the relative fortunes of
different fractions of property. For instance, Glasgow’s key inward investment strategy,
which currently focuses upon attracting call centre operations, computer software
companies and financial services companies, clearly has different implications for office
developers and those developers who provide industrial premises. As such, the inward
investment strategies of LECs can be expected to generate a variety of state/property
interfaces, with only a select group of property capitals receiving most benefit (Table 4).
One particularly interesting role played by the LECs in terms of encouraging inward
investment is that of providing market intelligence on available sites. Scottish Enterprise
has, for instance, been working with the Department of Land Economy at the University of
Paisley to create the Scottish Property Network. At the heart of this network is a database of
properties across Scotland classified by a variety of different criteria (e.g. vacant/occupied,
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lease dates, potential usage, cost per square foot, utilities available, and location). To date, this
database has offered a reasonably comprehensive list of industrial properties, with some office
and retail properties also included. With the exception of Aberdeen, the database has a wide
geographical coverage of the whole Scottish Enterprise Network. Individual LECs now have
access to this database and are making use of it to ease companies in their search for suitable
premises. Not only does this help inward investors find the right property quickly but it also
increases the efficiency with which the property needs of new and expanding indigenous firms
can be realised.
2.4. Planning and property development
Whilst local governments exercise a reasonable degree of autonomy in relation to
planning issues, the Scottish Office, through the SODD, can be seen to impinge upon
local government planning processes in a number of ways. Perhaps the most important
control placed upon local planning authorities is their need to adhere to the National
Planning Policy Guidelines (NPPGs) (formally National Planning Guidelines). These
represent not only official interpretation and portrayal of the various legislation, which
provide a framework for planning in Scotland, but also outline the planning priorities and
agendas that the Scottish Office wishes to set. At present a total of thirteen NPPG papers
have been produced. Of particular interest in the present context is NPPG 1 (Scottish
Office, 1994) which sets out the most fundamental characteristics of the planning system
in Scotland, NPPG 2 (Scottish Office, 1993) which defines the methods this system should
adopt in dealing with business and industry developments, and NPPG 8 (Revised)
(Scottish Office, 1998b), which provides guidelines on planning issues associated with
town centres and retailing development.
Across each NPPG is the planning architecture defined in NPPG 1. At its core are the
concepts of Development Plans, Structure Plans and Local Plans, each of which in their
own respects provides a framework within which planning decisions should be made.
Development Plans represent overarching planning frameworks for different regions.
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Table 4
Key inward investment sectors by LEC (July 1998) (Source: EKOS, 1998)
Glasgow Development Agency Financial services, call centres, software, biotechnology,
opto-electronics
Lanarkshire Development Agency Electronics, healthcare, call centres, engineering
Fife Enterprise Electronics, call centres
Lothian and Edinburgh Enterprise Electronics, financial services
Ayrshire Enterprise Electronics, call centres, software, aerospace
Renfrewshire Enterprise No key sectors
Scottish Enterprise Tayside Oil and gas, food, engineering, biotechnology, call centres
Forth Valley Enterprise Petro-chemicals, electronics
Grampian Enterprise Software, bio-technology, oil and gas
Dunbartonshire Enterprise No key sectors
Dumfries and Galloway Enterprise Plastics, forest products, tourism, food
Scottish Borders Enterprise No key sector
Moray/Badenoch/Strathspey Enterprise Tourism, food, call centres, manufacturing
Although produced at present by unitary authorities (or in some cases combinations of
unitary authorities) each plan can only be finally accepted (at the time of writing) with the
approval of the Secretary of State. Development Plans are intended to: provide a strategy to
guide the location of development for a period of 10 to 15 years; document the various
opportunities for developments which would suite particular areas; define the control stan-
dards to be imposed upon different developments; and highlight how development can best
be accommodated without jeopardising desirable natural and urban environments.
Development Plans consist of Structure and Local Plans. Structure Plans are formulated
in the recognition that planning often needs to be undertaken at a ‘regional scale’. They
comprise broad statements concerning strategic land use planning and as such set down a
coherent framework for the production of local plans. At present, the 32 unitary authorities
across Scotland are being asked to submit revised Structure Plans, either individually or as
part of a collective, and some are already at public consultation stages. Local Plans express
specific planning policy guidance and advice for particular localities. Local Plan areas do
not coincide with unitary authority areas and it is usual for the latter to produce a number
of plans for smaller internal units. At the end of May 1998, Scotland had 237 Local Plan
areas, with 212 plans formally adopted, 2 at the public local inquiry stage, 10 finalised, 8 at
the draft stage, and 4 started (Planning Bulletin, 1998). Unlike Structure Plans, which are
expected to have relatively long life expectancies, Local Plans are required to be revised
and/or revalidated every five years and thus their accommodation to the new Structure
Plans, which are emerging, is expected to be ongoing.
The growing significance of pro-development objectives tempered by the continued
significance of the basic planning framework and the regulatory and control functions of
planning can be seen in other NPPGs. NPPG 2 specifically deals with industrial develop-
ments but it also implicitly concerns itself with office construction. At a general level,
NPPG 2 requires that Development Plans explicitly address a number of key economic
issues. For instance, Structure Plans are required to “allocate land to provide for a market-
able supply of general industrial and business class land throughout the period”, to “justify
the allocation by reference to the overall strategy and indicate the spatial distribution of the
supply, taking into account the full spectrum of industrial and business needs”, and to
“indicate and clearly justify the priority, if any, to be given to particular types of economic
development”. Further, Local Plans are instructed to “identify sites in conformity with the
Structure Plan applications”, “include policies for determining development proposals for
sites not in marketable supply”, and to “state the means by which new sites will be brought
forward as identified sites are developed”. Significantly, Local Plans are also requested to
encourage the redevelopment of brownfield sites as opposed to greenfield construction
wherever possible, and to consider introducing Simplified Planning Zones as a promotion
device. Beyond these somewhat general guidelines, NPPG 2 identifies a number of sites
deemed to be ‘National Sites’ by virtue of their significance to national economic devel-
opment. Four types of national sites are identified: large, single user high amenity sites;
medium sized industrial sites; large industrial and business sites; and large petrochemical
sites. Development Plans are required to adopt specific policies in relation to each of these
types. Finally, given the potential for ‘mega-projects’ to impact upon the remainder of
Scotland, NPPG 2 instructs that all proposals requiring greater that 100 ha of land must be
authorised by the Secretary of State.
R. Rogerson, M. Boyle / Progress in Planning 54 (2000) 133–196 157
NPPG 8 (Revised) also illustrates the desire to channel development in particular
directions. It provides a series of policy guidelines in relation to town centres and
retailing. By retailing is meant everything from new regional and district shopping
centres, through retail parks and factory outlet centres to commercial leisure centres,
superstores and supermarkets, and restaurants and pubs. Following three decades of out
of town retail development, and the much discussed demise of the vitality and viability
of the traditional town centre, NPPG 8 (Revised) represents a dedicated planning
approach to the concentration of new retail developments in, and the rebirth of, conven-
tional town centres. To this end, its key concept is the notion of a sequential approach.
Future development (to the extent that it is in the interests of the area and Scotland, in the
case of regional shopping centres) should first be located in existing town centres, should
consider edge of town locations if relevant sites are not available, and should only be
located out of town as a last resort and providing a number of stringent criteria are met.
To this end, Structure Plans are instructed to “set out the policy for supporting and
enhancing town centres, including an assessment of how far the existing town centres
might be able to meet the demands for new shopping floorspace and other uses”, and
“reflect upon the criteria set out in this guideline against which retail and commercial
leisure development proposals outwith town centres should be assessed”. Local Plans,
meanwhile, are required to “aim to safeguard and support existing town centres and other
retail facilities such as local centres and village shops, where they are serving the local
community well”, and “identify sites, including those suitable and available within a
reasonable timescale, for new retail and commercial leisure developments, within town
centres, and, if appropriate at the edge of centre”.
The fact that the present system of land use planning has persisted across the last twenty
five years is indicative that, at least in terms of planning, no clear transition from Fordism
to post-Fordism can be detected in urban Scotland. In part this apparent lack of transition
reflects the under-developed ways in which the post-Fordist mode of regulation has been
applied to local planning. Indeed, there is a dearth of accounts, which explore the new
characteristics, practices and functions to be anticipated, even theoretically, under a post-
Fordist model. In Goodwin and Painter’s Goodwin and Painter (1996) account of the ideal
typical form of post-Fordist local governance, for example, there is not even specific
engagement with planning. What has been suggested as representing such a post-Fordist
planning system is one which involves “the creation of arm’s-length organisations for a
variety of tasks from hearing planning appeals to disposing of waste; the emphasis of
responsiveness and flexibility in all planning decisions; [and] the attack on planning as an
activity under professional control operating within a state bureaucracy” (Rydin, 1998:
351). From the above discussion, it is clear that the existing planning system in Scotland
falls far short of even these basic characteristics, not only in terms of its architecture but
also its practices.
In 1998, the Scottish Office produced a comprehensive review of development planning
in Scotland (Scottish Office, 1998c). This review is interesting in so far as it might
reasonably be expected that any shift in planning philosophy would be detected from
its recommendations. The review argued that whilst the basic legislative framework for
planning remained sufficient, the practice of Development Plan proposal, implementation,
and evolution required modification. In some ways, proposed changes would seem to
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reflect a growing pro-development agenda for planning. For instance, among the recom-
mendations reached were:
(a) the entire preparation time of Local Plans, and the time taken by the Secretary of
State to authorise Structure Plans, requires to be greatly speeded up. Developers, for
instance, demanded that published timetables be backed up by sanctions from central
government, not least in order to get around the problem of pre-maturity being cited as a
reason for refusal of planning permission;
(b) plans are too closely associated with local authorities and are largely ignored by key
resource agencies. Whilst planning authorities desired to keep their roles as central
owners of plans, the review recommended that ownership be widened to include
local development agencies and developers among other groups. This would ensure a
wider sense of legitimacy;
(c) the preparation of plans should be an ongoing processes, rather than a once and
for all exercise. Not only will this improve the speed of plan preparation but it will
also ensure that plans can be modified in the light of short term changes in
conditions;
It would be disingenuous, however, to conclude that something fundamental was
happening to the planning system in Scotland on the basis of this report as it too
raised concerns about including more voices from the community in planning decision
making and ensuring that all local plans had effective public local inquiries. By advo-
cating a retention of the existing planning architecture, this review further points to the
limited possibilities which exist for the development of a full-blown post-Fordist turn in
planning regulation of property markets by the Scottish state.
2.5. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have chosen to focus upon seven of the most important sites
of contact which exist between the state and the property sector in urban Scotland.
Drawing upon wider literature on the restructuring of the local state in the United
Kingdom across the past two decades, we have enquired into the kinds of transfor-
mations in the nature of these interfaces that might have been expected in urban
Scotland specifically. From an examination of evidence of change on the ground, we
have attempted to build a picture that we hope will prove useful to the reader in the
interpretation of our survey results to follow. It is our central argument that whilst
the rise of post-Fordist forms of urban governance can certainly be detected in
Scottish cities, and whilst this has served to create new local state/property inter-
faces, it would be a mistake to exaggerate the extent to which the state has turned
away from market regulation and intervention. Interfaces between the local state and
property consist of a complex mixture of old relationships, old relationships modi-
fied to cope with new circumstances, as well as entirely new sets of connections. It
is undoubtedly best, therefore, to conceptualise property politics as developing
amidst a maelstrom of change, rather than reflecting a clear-cut philosophical
shift in the governance of Scottish cities. Change is a messy phenomenon and in
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many senses the local state continues to function in its traditional role; as a regu-
lator of property markets, and as an agent of intervention, trying to direct, shape,
and even at times control the ways in which the property market operates for
political ends.
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CHAPTER 3
Research design: identifying and surveying property mobilising agents
Having identified the context within which this study is placed—the shift in the forms
of local governance in Britain in general and Scotland specifically—here we turn to
consider the survey which forms the backbone of the remainder of the paper. Given
that this survey represents the first major effort to reveal patterns of property politics in
urban Scotland, we develop and justify the research design employed at some length. We
start with an outline of the key group of property players that comprise the specific focus of
the study. As noted in Chapter 1, we have chosen to refer to these types of players as
property mobilising agents, and we begin by positioning these agents within existing
typologies. We then turn attention to the methodological considerations which have
been addressed in developing and undertaking the survey. These considerations are
offered, not only as a backdrop to the results considered in the next two chapters, but
also as a contribution to help navigate future work in this area.
3.1. Positioning property mobilising agents
Broadly speaking there exist two overarching approaches to the production of
typologies of property companies. At one level research has focussed on the wider position
of property within circuits of capital. Therein typologies have been constructed within the
terms of the ultimate origins of capital; that is, the particular circuits from which capital
derives. Whilst not mutually exclusive, a second literature has developed recently which,
being aware of the wider context, nevertheless seeks to privilege the battery of mediating
institutions which serve to ground capital in particular places at particular times. Our focus
on property mobilising agents sits more comfortably within this latter, institutional
approach.
3.1.1. Property capital and players
In geography, the legacy of Harvey’s (Harvey 1982, 1985) reading of the location of
property within the capitalist system remains strong. For Harvey, property had to be linked
to both primary circuit needs—for example, development for expansion of production—
and to the development of the built environment arising from capital switching to the
secondary circuit as a ‘safety mechanism’. Harvey’s notions have been extended further in
the 1990s with, e.g. Leyshon and Thrift’s (1997) recent work which explores the relative
autonomy of financial circuits from other capital circuits. Their argument points to the
logic of considering that some capital invested in property development may be derived
from financial circuits, which have a high level of separation from the primary and
secondary circuits discussed by Harvey.
By locating property within the wider capitalist system, some authors have argued that
the property development process can be dissected into a series of fractions of capital,
each occupying a different structural position within the overall system. Barras (1979)
has suggested, for example, that four types of capital can be identified in this way:
commercial (the development company); financial (investing and funding institutions);
R. Rogerson, M. Boyle / Progress in Planning 54 (2000) 133–196 161
landed (owners) and industrial (construction companies). Whilst useful insofar as it
attempts to ground typologies within the wider capital accumulation process, Barras’
framework is, however, limited in that it fails to appreciate fully the further divisions of
each category. Consequently this approach has been viewed as tending to elevate struc-
tural forces working beyond the built environment over a focus on individual actors, and
at the same time giving hegemony to capital rather than, to say, political and cultural
systems. King (1989) notes that, whilst Harvey recognises a role in the construction of
the built environment for ‘mediating institutions’, in focusing mainly on the deeper
structures of capital “there is little room in the theory for the role of individual agency,
nor even for consideration of how mediating institutions came about in the first place”
(King, 1989: 452).
More sophisticated attempts have been made, nevertheless, which, while starting from
the circuits of capital perspective, have progressed to a more detailed understanding of the
various structures through which property development is played out. Drawing on Malo-
ne’s (1985) analysis of those capitals involved in property development in Dublin,
Bryson’s (1997) recent paper illustrates how different types of capital can be related to
separate actors or agents in the property development process. For instance, Bryson
represents the position of the property developer between four other sets of interests:
the financier and money markets; the landowner and the land market; the investor and
tenant and the property market; and the constructor and industrial capital. As he notes
“each type of capital competes for a share of the development profit generated from each
property development; their relative shares are determined by their relations within the
overall process of production” (Bryson, 1997: 1441). In this portrayal, the developer has a
pivotal role mediating these interests to ensure that development of a property actually
takes place.
Others, adopting a perspective from within the building profession, have advocated a
slightly different set of relations. Isaac (1996), for example, has conceived of the parties
involved in the development process as shown above in Fig. 4. For him, the different
capitals involved in the development process are encapsulated within the ‘clients’ and
‘funders’ boxes. Clients, a diverse range of actors, including developers, landowners, and
investor/traders, represent a different form of capital from the providers of short-term and
long-term funding (the funders). The other groups are those whose roles involve the
grounding of this capital and the regulation of the development process.
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Fig. 4. Representing the property development process.
3.1.2. Institutional perspectives
Some authors now recognise that relating the roles played by those involved in the
property development process to their wider positions in circuits of capital is not only
difficult, but is also, perhaps, misplaced. An alternative perspective, arising in part from
critiques of such neo-Marxist theses, argues that “the built environment is the result of the
relationships between agents and institutions within the local economy on the one hand,
and with regional, national, and international financial and development interests which
are influenced by structural factors on the other hand” (van der Krabben and Lambooy,
1993, 1384). This alternative, institutional perspective seeks to draw attention to the
battery of actors who are responsible for grounding capital in particular spaces at particular
times. It argues that whilst wider structural factors cannot be ignored, it is towards more
empirical analysis of particular relationships between the actors who mediate between
capital and the built environment that greater attention needs to be given.
By focusing on the ways in which different actors are involved in the urban develop-
ment process and the relations between them, these studies have shifted the emphasis away
from a circuits of capital approach towards one that addresses the neglected area of the
negotiated and mediated positions adopted by agents and agencies relative to local,
regional, national and global forces. This is aptly summarised in Healey and Barrett’s
(1990: 90) call for a new research agenda for the 1990s: “the critical task for the analyst
seeking to understand the process of production of the built environment is an examination
of how such external pressures are reflected in and affected by the way individual agents
determine their strategies and conduct their relationships as they deal with specific
projects and issues, and as they consider their future stream of activities” (italics in
original).
3.1.3. Property mobilising agents
In selecting companies for this study, we have taken cognisance of the typologies
produced in both of these traditions. Whilst we appreciate the need to position property
players in relation to the circuits of capital from which they derive, we have found it
impossible to obtain the necessary company-based data for this to be practicable. Our
sampling frame was not, therefore, drawn up on the basis of the ultimate origins of the
sources of capital involved in property development in urban Scotland. On the other hand,
we find persuasive aspects of the institutional perspective, which downplays the signifi-
cance of locating capital at a deeper level in any case, and which focuses on the array of
actors who mobilise capital markets of whatever origins. The merits of this institutional
approach have been the enhanced emphasis placed on those agents and agencies involved
in property development and the recognition that their interests need reflect not only wider
economic arguments.
Consequently, in developing our typology we have tended more towards the insti-
tutional perspective and its more disaggregated accounts of the key players. There is,
however, one theoretical point within this perspective with which we cannot agree. Whilst
we do recognise the need to locate any one actor within the sets of relations operating in
the context of any one development, we do not see this forbidding the possibility of
intercepting only some tiers of the process. In relation to property politics the institutional
perspective would argue that there is a need to contextualise the activities of any one
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player against the background of the political behaviour of other players. In so doing, there
is a tendency to overemphasise the singularity of the political activities associated with
any one development and to downplay the fact that different actor groups might share a
common political agenda. In other words, all property-marketing agents must surely be
thought of as having a different political agenda from say property developers or property
investors. The point we are making is that there is a dynamic to the political behaviour of
property companies which goes beyond the sets of relations associated with individual
development projects. Therefore, our sample frame has sought to identify a collection of
companies who perform similar roles in the property development process.
Although in the literature the group we refer to has most frequently been termed
developers, we reject this terminology and advocate instead the term ‘property mobilising
agents’. As defined here the role of property mobilising agents is threefold: first, such
companies must be actively involved in investing capital in office, industrial or retail
property; second, they must be investing with the purpose of enhancing the value of the
property through refurbishment, redevelopment or subdivision; and thirdly, they must
have the intention to sell or lease property to other companies. By adopting this definition,
we are explicitly excluding from the study companies who invest in domestic and housing
property, those who invest without an intention to enhance the property value through
development, and those who invest as owner occupiers.
In focussing upon this group we do not wish to downplay the significance of the
property politics which might be generated by these other actors. Clearly, these additional
types of agents can be expected to have different sets of relations with the state and thus
adopt different practices of politicking. Nevertheless, as defined, property mobilising
agents would seem to be a term with theoretical integrity capturing a cohort of capital
in the development process which is likely to be unique. We argue this for two reasons.
First, and if there is any merit in the local dependence argument, this group should be more
politicised insofar as its attachment to place ought to be more strongly developed by virtue
of its engagement in three activities; investment, development and selling/leasing. Second,
and given these multiple roles, property mobilising agents ought to be engaging with state
policy and initiatives on a wider front than those actors excluded.
Working with this definition the companies which form part of our sample frame,
therefore, cut across some of the categories which might be recognised by the institutional
analysts. Fig. 5 tries to summarise the broad categories of actors who are of greatest
relevance. Aside from the state—which is clearly not the subject of this paper—four
other mobilising actors are recognised: developers, land owners, property owners, and
property financiers. Obviously not all companies in these categories in Scotland perform
each of the three functions necessary for inclusion here. Only a fraction of each will form
the basis of the survey sample. Further, whilst not forming the main thrust of this paper,
Fig. 5 also illustrates the way in which, amongst these mobilising agents, some will have a
closer relationship, firstly, to specific parts of the development process (ie. a development
company whilst categorised here as a mobilising agent may still be required to be identi-
fied as a developer in other settings) and, secondly, to some circuits of capital than others
(e.g. property owners may be in the primary circuit, whilst property financiers will feel
more at home in the finance circuit).
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3.2. Identifying property mobilising agents in Scotland
Having sought to contextualise our category of property mobilising agents within
general typologies available in the literature, we turn attention here to the mechanics of
identifying the range of property mobilising agents who operate specifically in Scotland.
This task has involved three stages. First, a database was generated using secondary data
sources which contained diagnostic information about companies which might qualify
under the above definition. Second, this database was refined through a telephone survey
to produce the sample frame. Third, and finally, a questionnaire survey was sent to each of
these companies in order to explore their involvement in property politics. We consider the
questionnaire survey results in Chapter 4.
3.2.1. Constructing the database
Identifying those mobilising agents involved in property development in urban Scotland
is not easy. Certainly analysis of available datasets suggests that the kinds of categories the
academic literature in general identify do not resonate with those employed within the
industry. With complex sets of relations between capital sources and mobilising agents,
and with the involvement of companies ranging from global organisations through to
local, single site actors, it is unsurprising that no single database of agents exists in the
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Fig. 5. Defining property mobilising agents.
UK. This conclusion was confirmed in initial enquiries with the Royal Institution of
Chartered Surveys, Investment Property Databank (IPD), and Ryden International
property consultants.
Consequently, our research began with a review of the more general business directories
available in the United Kingdom. Given the research aims of the project, each directory
was assessed on three key criteria:
† the extent to which comprehensive coverage of the property sector was achieved;
† how up-to-date the available information was;
† the degree to which a clear delineation could be made between companies in the
property sector and other companies listed.
As shown in Table 5, the only directories that satisfied all three criteria were the Scottish
Business Register and Key British Enterprises, both published by Dun and Bradstreet.
These directories, therefore, were chosen to create the basic database from which the
research could progress.
In addition to meeting the basic criteria, another key benefit derived from the use of
these two Dun and Bradstreet directories was that their shared authorship ensured that
information was provided on a comparable, systematic basis. Furthermore, the similar
notation used in each directory made cross-referencing between the directories relatively
easy.
These two directories undoubtedly give the most comprehensive list of property and
property-related industries available. The Key British Enterprises directory lists the top
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Table 5




Dun and Bradstreet—Key British Enterprises 1997 (Top
50 000 Companies)
p p p
Dun and Bradstreet Scottish Business Register 1997 p p p
Scotland’s Top 2000 Companies—Financial Survey 1997 p p £
Property Trade Directory 1997—Directory of Estate Agents
in the UK
£ p p
Regional Sales Leads 1997 £ p p
Smaller UK Companies Handbook—1997/Financial Times £ p p
The Company Guide 1997 £ p p
Scottish Property Network £ p p
Scottish Chambers of Commerce Directory 1997 £ p £
Who owns Whom 1997/1998 (Dun & Bradstreet) £ p £
Directory of Glasgow Companies 1995 £ £ p
Kompass—Volumes I–III £ £ p
Directory of property developers, investors and financiers—
1988/89
£ £ £
F.A.M.E.—Financial Accounts Made Easy £ £ £
Jordan’s Britain’s Top 3000 Property Developers 1991 £ £ £
Jordan’s—Britain’s Top 10 000 privately owned businesses. £ £ £
50 000 companies in the UK and, therefore, the largest companies with headquarters in
Scotland. The Scottish Business Directory compiles details of headquarters and branches
located in Scotland. As it includes companies with more than 5 employees or annual sales
turnover exceeding £250 000, a range of small to very large companies were included.
Given their general coverage, these directories failed to offer a straightforward mechan-
ism through which property mobilising agents could be directly sifted out. Therefore, it
was necessary to start by constructing a database consisting of all companies which might
conform to the definition of mobilising agents cited above. This task required a selection of
US Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes to be employed as a common reference
point. These codes were identified in two ways. First, all codes listed in the directories
under the heading of ‘property’ were included, and where individual entries of companies
also referred to other SIC codes these were added to the list. Second, and augmenting the
directories, the Scottish Property Network (SPN) based at the University of Paisley (see
Chapter 2) was requested to provide information on additional SIC codes which might be
of relevance. Table 6 lists the SIC codes of the categories used in the compilation of the
initial database, with those categories in bold being represented in the final sample frame
(see 3.2.2. below). This initial database was dominated by four groupings: builders with
1500 codes; financial institutions (codes 6000–6300); property groups (6500 codes) and
investors (6700 codes). The other SIC groups had fewer than five entries in each.
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Table 6
Standard Industrial Classification codes used in constructing the database
US SIC code Category title
1531 Operative builders
1541 Industrial building contractors
1542 Non-residential building contractors
3312 Blast furnaces, Steelworks
4469 Miscellaneous water transportation services
5141 General grocery wholesalers
6012 Authorised banks and deposit takers
6111 Miscellaneous financial institutions
6311 Life assurance
6351 Surety insurance
6371 Pension, health and welfare
6411 Insurance agents, brokers and services
6512 Non-residential building operations
6519 Miscellaneous real property lessors
6531 Real estate agents and managers
6552 Subdividers and developers (not cemeteries)
6711 Holding companies
6724 Unit investment trusts
6799 Miscellaneous investor
7361 Employment agencies
7392 Managing consultants and public relations
7699 Miscellaneous repair services
8331 Job training and vocational services
8399 Miscellaneous social services
Initially, the Key British Enterprises directory was used to derive a list of property
mobilising agents. The chosen SIC codes were identified and cross-referenced by geogra-
phical regions, with the information on companies with headquarters in Scotland recorded.
The same SIC code method was used with the Scottish Business Register where every
additional HQ entry that came under a relevant SIC code was entered into the database.
Where branch entries appeared, the available information was also recorded, as was the
location of the company’s HQ. Through this process of construction, a total of 831
companies were identified in this database.
3.2.2. Constructing the sample frame
This database was employed in an initial attempt to ensure comprehensive coverage of
all possible relevant property and property-related companies operating in Scotland.
However, partly because of its derivation from general directories constructed obviously
for reasons beyond this research and also because of the wide scope of the SIC categories
employed, it was anticipated that of the 831 companies in this database, some—if not
many—would lie outside of the category of mobilising agent discussed earlier. Indeed, it
was difficult from the data contained in the directories to ascertain even the degree to
which the companies had an involvement in property development, and an involvement in
Scotland. Given our desire to sieve out only those companies meeting our requirements,
each of the 831 firms were contacted to refine the database. An initial telephone survey
was conducted in which the following filter question, defining mobilising agents, was
employed:
“does [your company] invest in commercial, industrial or retail property for the purpose
of refurbishing, redeveloping or subdividing this property to sell, or to lease out to other
companies?”
If respondents answered “yes” to this question, they were sent a copy of the survey
questionnaire and included in the revised database. If respondents answered “no”, the
nature of their company’s business was noted and they were placed in the “non-property
mobilising agent” category. This filtering process resulted in the original database of 831
companies derived from the Dun and Bradstreet directories being refined as shown in
Table 7 below.
The 189 companies who had been identified as property mobilising agents were sent a
survey questionnaire. This questionnaire was divided into four sections. In the first section,
information was sought on the characteristics of the company in order to allow greater
insight into its structure. This was followed by a section, which in general terms attempted
to ascertain the different tiers of government which the firm had been active in lobbying
and the different channels through which they had voiced opinions. In the final two
sections, attention turned to political lobbying of local government and LECs respectively,
asking the respondents to detail specific ways in which they had engaged with both of
these agents of local governance. Through the use of a variety of contacts with the
companies, including follow-up telephone calls and further letters of explanation and
copies of the survey questionnaire, a response rate of 57.1% was obtained. A total of
108 companies, therefore, provided information and it is upon these responses which
Chapter 4 is constructed.
R. Rogerson, M. Boyle / Progress in Planning 54 (2000) 133–196168
3.3. Characterising the property mobilising agents
Prior to engaging with the data on property politics derived from these survey responses,
we wish, first, to profile a number of the principal characteristics of the survey population
which can be gleaned from the secondary data sources employed to construct the database
and, second, to summarise what we perceive to be the principal methodological contribu-
tions which this research has made. In considering the characteristics of the survey





A Answered: questionnaire returned by target company 108
B Declined to respond 39
C Not answered 42
Total
189
D Not property mobilising agents
Active in residential market only 72
Builders/solicitors/etc with no property/investment development functions 117
Fund/trust managers involved in sharemarket only 46
Equipment leasing 5
Bank only 9
Financiers of property development 4
Deer hunting estates 3
Completely different sector 101
Company listed under another name in the list 11
Company collapsed 12
Umbrella or subsidiary company with property arm/subsidiary elsewhere on
list
95
Umbrella or subsidiary company of another firm (non-target) 4
Merged with another firm on list 6
Taken over by another firm 4
Property interests totally managed by another firm on list 1
Trust fund managed by another firm on list 9
Do have holdings in Scotland but constitute approx. 1% of total 1
Questionnaire returned by no-targeted company 37
Total
537
E Unable to trace company
No listing in phonebook 50
Same listing in phonebook, but out of business 32
Sent back through post and no company listing 2
Engaged/no answer multiple times 13
Number not recognised and new number not recognised 4




population of 189 companies, it is important to note that no claims are being made here
that these firms are representative of the entire population of mobilising agents responsible
for shaping urban Scotland. Given the above process, the most that can be claimed is that
the 189 firms represent some of the largest mobilising agents active in Scotland.
Previous research on property developers has typologised such agents in terms of
production output, operational characteristics, financial and market power, and size and
number of employees (CALUS, 1979; Leung, 1986; Fothergill et al., 1987). Whilst the
two main secondary data sets utilised—Dun and Bradstreet Key British Enterprises 1997
and Dun and Bradstreet Scottish Business Register 1997—proffered a list of a variety of
firm characteristics (Table 8), in practice only a minimum number of such indicators are
available for this analysis. In many instances we found that different pieces of data were
missing making aggregate analysis too piecemeal to be meaningful. Particularly, measures
such company turnover, profit/loss, and total assets, which would clearly have been useful,
are listed in such an inconsistent way as to render these criteria inaccessible for this
analysis. A review of the indicators which are sufficiently represented points to five as
most deserving of inclusion (listed in bold in Table 8).
Following our survey, it has become obvious that, in some instances, data collected
directly from companies conflicts with that provided in the Dun and Bradstreet directories.
This might become apparent to the reader in the next chapter, where we produce a more
detailed typology of the 108 respondents using data derived from our primary survey. Of
course, given that Dun and Bradstreet was published in 1997 and our survey was not
conducted until spring 1998, observed differences might simply be due to changing
company circumstances through time. On occasions, however, it would seem that data
differ by orders of magnitude, suggesting that differences might reflect some more
deep-seated problem in that the methodology utilised by Dun and Bradstreet might
have extracted different answers to those obtained through direct contact with companies.
We do not wish to speculate on the causes of these differences, nor whether our data are
more accurate than that provided by Dun and Bradstreet. To draw such conclusions would
require a separate analysis of the methodologies used in both instances. This is clearly
beyond the scope of this paper. We thus operate on the assumption that both datasets have
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Table 8
Key characteristics of property companies listed in Dun and Bradstreet
Company name
Company structure: headquarters, branch, holdings not in Scotland
Headquarters location: in Scotland, United Kingdom
Directory source:—Key British Enterprises, Scottish Business Register, SPN
Accounting parentage—listed company is parent or is subsidiary
Company location: town, county, postcode
Contact details: telephone number, fax number, Director’s name
Year of establishment
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
Level of sales (£) from the latest year recorded. Sales, turnover, total assets
Profit or loss from the latest year recorded
Number of employees
integrity within their own terms of reference, and that provided the origins of the data are
clearly specified, it is legitimate to undertake typological analysis using both datasets.
The following tables (Tables 9–13) make use of the five indicators (shown in bold in
Table 8) to portray the profile of the 189 property mobilising agents making up the survey
population. From these tables it would appear that:
† the bulk of the firms are parents in their own right, with a minority of the survey
population listed as subsidiaries (Table 9);
† the majority of companies (over 80%) are Scottish based, and that whilst the big four
Local Enterprise Company areas, based around the conurbations of Glasgow,
Edinburgh, Dundee and Aberdeen, are the dominant Scottish locations (housing 62%
of all firms), mobilising agents are to be found further down the hierarchy and beyond
Scotland’s largest cities (Table 10);
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Table 9
Company status (Source: authors’ survey. Note: percentages may not add up to 100 because of rounding.)
Survey population Sample
Parent 90 (48%) 55 (51%)
Subsidiary 29 (15%) 16 (15%)
No data 70 (37%) 38 (35%)
Total 189 108
Table 10
Company location, by Local Enterprise Company area (Source: authors’ survey. Note: percentages may not add
up to 100 because of rounding.)
Location Survey Population Sample
Glasgow Development Agency 50 (26%) 25 (23%)
Lothian and Edinburgh
Enterprise
31 (16%) 18 (17%)
Scottish Enterprise Tayside 19 (10%) 10 (9%)
Grampian Enterprise 19 (10%) 13 (12%)
Ayrshire Enterprise 6 (3%) 4 (4%)
Fife Enterprise 6 (3%) 3 (3%)
Lanarkshire Development
Agency
6 (3%) 2 (2%)
Forth Valley Enterprise 5 (3%) 4 (4%)
Renfrewshire Enterprise 5 (3%) 2 (2%)
Scottish Borders Enterprise 2 (1%) 2 (2%)
Dumfries and Galloway
Enterprise
1 (1%) 1 (1%)
Dunbartonshire Enterprise 1 (1%) 1 (1%)
Highlands and Islands Enterprise 4 (2%) 1 (1%)
London 22 (12%) 15 (14%)
England (other) 12 (6%) 7 (6%)
Total 189 108
† whilst a significant number of firms are very small (35% of the survey population have
10 or fewer employees), the dataset is composed of companies of a variety of different
sizes. Indeed, almost 40% of the survey population employs over 30 people, with
9 companies employing greater that 5001 employees and one company actually
employing over 50 000 employees (Table 11);
† whilst some companies have been in existence for some time (18% of the survey
population indicating a date of establishment prior to 1950, and indeed one (Aberdeen
Harbour Board) indicating twelfth century origins), the vast majority of firms in the
survey population date from 1950 onwards. Indeed with over 50% of firms being
established since 1970, and 40% having existence from 1980 onwards, it is clear the
backbone of the survey population is of recent origins. This chimes with the concept
that the growth of mobilising agents, at least in their current form, has been a recent one
(Table 12);
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Table 11
Company size as measured by number of employees (Source: authors’ survey. Note: percentages may not add up
to 100 because of rounding.)
Number of employees Number of firms
Survey population Sample
1–5 24 (13%) 18 (17%)
6–10 41 (22%) 24 (22%)
11–15 15 (8%) 7 (6%)
16–30 17 (9%) 9 (8%)
31–100 33 (17%) 18 (17%)
101–200 11 (6%) 6 (6%)
201–400 9 (5%) 4 (4%)
401–1000 5 (3%) 5 (5%)
1001–5000 6 (3%) 4 (4%)
5001–50000 8 (4%) 5 (5%)
. 50000 1 (1%) 1 (1%)
No data 19 (10%) 7 (6%)
Total 189 108
Table 12
Date of establishment of companies (Source: authors’ survey. Note: percentages may not add up to 100 because
of rounding.)
Date of establishment Number of firms
Survey population Sample population
Pre 1950 34 (18%) 21 (20%)
1950–1959 10 (5%) 7 (6%)
1960–1969 18 (10%) 12 (11%)
1970–1979 27 (14%) 16 (15%)
1980–1989 50 (26%) 28 (26%)
1990–1998 27 (14%) 13 (12%)
No Data 23 (12%) 11 (10%)
Total 189 108
† mobilising agents reside within a disparate group of SIC codes, with codes 6531, 6552,
6519, and 1541 dominating (Table 13).
Using the indicators available from the Dun and Bradstreet directories, the above tables
also illustrate some typological comparisons of the survey population (189) and sample of
respondents (108). From the data which can be gleaned from these secondary data sources
it would seem that the survey population tends to have a slightly greater proportion of
parent firms to subsidiaries, Scottish companies to English ones, and companies of recent
(to a significant extent post-1980s) origin. Fundamentally, however, there would appear to
be no evidence to suggest that firms falling under the different sets of classification used
above were more or less likely to participate in the questionnaire survey. The lesson to be
learned for future studies which seek to investigate the political activities of mobilising
agents is that it is worthwhile covering all bases as there appear to be no systematic
tendencies for any particular type of mobilising agent to be more or less likely to complete
a questionnaire.
3.4. Summarising the methodological contributions
To end this chapter, it is worth reflecting on what we believe to be the three key
methodological contributions provided by the research design employed here. First, whilst
in most studies of the property industry the role of the developer has been viewed as
pivotal, precise definition of such players has been lacking. In offering an alternative focus
on property mobilising agents, we suggest a more robust category that serves to pin down
three specific characteristics of significance in interpreting property politics. In this
respect, we provide a less problematic term in identifying property agents who are
involved in investment into property, who are active in the enhancement of property
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Table 13
Official SIC Codes of Sample and Survey (Source: Authors’ survey. Note: Percentages may not add up to 100
because of rounding.)
SIC code (US) Survey population Sample
6531 Real estate agents and managers 36 (20%) 17 (16%)
6552 Subdividers and developers 22 (12%) 10 (9%)
6519 Miscellaneous real property lessors 18 (10%) 12 (11%)
1541 Industrial building contractors 17 (9%) 10 (9%)
6512 Non-residential building operations 14 (7%) 6 (6%)
6799 Miscellaneous investor 14 (7%) 9 (8%)
6711 Holding companies 13 (7%) 6 (6%)
1542 Non-residential building contractors 10 (5%) 6 (6%)
1531 Operative builders 9 (5%) 8 (7%)
6311 Life assurance 6 (3%) 4 (4%)
6724 Unit investment trusts 5 (3%) 4 (4%)
6111 Miscellaneous financial institutions 5 (3%) 2 (2%)
Other SIC Codes , 5 20 (11%) 14 (13%)
Total 189 108
value through development, and who trade locational advantage through the leasing and
selling of property.
Second, in addressing the problem of a lack of a national database of key property
players, this study has provided a first attempt at producing a database of property
mobilising agents in particular. What is evident is that it is not possible to use existing
general business directories to devise a list of such players or indeed to draw on the
Standard Industrial Classification system for this purpose. Even when sieving general
business directories for relevant companies, it has of course to be acknowledged that
they tend to cover only the largest companies in the UK (thus excluding overseas
companies) and, on occasions, only Scotland. They, therefore, cannot be used to identify
a representative sample for research purposes.
Third, and finally, this chapter has shown that once mobilising agents have been
identified there would appear to be no systematic tendency in the likelihood of certain
firms responding to academic research surveys. It would appear that our response rate is
immune to the variations in those key characteristics which can be gleaned from business
directories. It is worthwhile, therefore, for future research to attempt a comprehensive
coverage since no efficiency gains can be achieved by targeting specific company types. It
is towards an analysis of the companies who did respond to the questionnaire survey that
attention now turns.
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CHAPTER 4
Property politics in Scotland
In this chapter, we aim to provide a broad overview of the main results produced
through our survey of property mobilising agents in urban Scotland. Our focus is confined,
therefore, to the 108 companies who completed the questionnaire. It is worthwhile at this
stage, restating the four major aims of the survey outlined in the first chapter. These were:
† to assess the degree to which property mobilising agents are politically active in Scot-
land, gauging the importance of local level activity in relation to political activity at
higher levels of government;
† to examine the main channels through which property mobilising agents articulate their
concerns to the state;
† to ascertain whether there are any differences in the lobbying behaviour of different
types of property mobilising agents;
† to assess whether the recent shifts in the structures and strategies of urban governance
have created new sites of political lobbying.
All four of these aims will be examined in this chapter. We begin, however, by using
background information on firms collected through the survey to provide a more detailed
typological analysis than was possible in the previous chapter. At this stage, the objective
is to clarify some of the more important characteristics of companies that might help in the
interpretation of differences between mobilising agents in terms of their political
behaviour.
4.1. Characteristics of survey respondents
Given the limitations of the secondary datasets described in the previous chapter,
background information collected on companies as part of the survey provides a useful
backdrop to any analysis of their political behaviour. As noted in Chapter 3, data collected
on company characteristics in the survey deviates in many instances from that provided in
the secondary datasets used. Our method of coping with such differences has been to
assume that both secondary and primary data used herein have integrity within their
own terms of reference. As our data on political activities derives solely from our
questionnaire survey, and given that we requested more comprehensive and detailed
information on company characteristics in the questionnaire, we operate only with our
primary survey data here.
We now consider three key diagnostic characteristics—company size, geographical
location, and nature of activity—to provide an overview of the 108 respondents. Whilst
these three characteristics offer only limited coverage, the intention is to furnish readers
with sufficient insight into the types of firms which comprised the sample so as to render
their reading of the rest of this paper’s analysis of property politics in Scotland more
comprehensible. Perhaps inevitably, efforts to discern whether there exist any distinctive
differences in the characteristics of firms raise more questions than they answer. Thus, for
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example, we resist the desire to refine further our typological analysis through a series of
cross-tabulations. Instead we offer a brief overview of each categorisation without drawing
out inter-relationships.
4.1.1. Company size
To the extent that company size has an influence on the volume and nature of
companies’ political activities, it is useful to ascertain whether firms displayed any
systematic differences in terms of size. In the survey, company turnover and number of
employees were noted as two indicators of size. In regard to company turnover, firms were
first asked their total turnover in the last financial year. Of the 90 firms who completed this
section, 1 in 4 indicated turnover of less than £1 million, with a further 44% having
turnover of between £1 million and £10 million. The survey also identified 11 ‘super-rich’
companies each generating a total income greater than £100 million (Table 14).
Assuming that property activities might constitute only part of companies’ overall
business, and in a desire to clarify the absolute turnover of companies activities in regard
to their property activities, companies were also asked to state the proportion of their total
turnover which could be attributed to the property sector. Table 14 also portrays the broad
divisions here. Two points are worth observing. Firstly, once other areas of company
activities have been stripped away, there is a slightly greater tendency for some property
mobilising agents to cluster at the lower end of the size scale, with nearly 64% having less
than £10m turnover in property and fewer companies having greater than £100m.
However, secondly, perhaps more striking is the fact that for most companies, and
especially smaller ones, the majority of turnover is generated in property. What the survey
points to, therefore, are generally high levels of property-dependence amongst the
companies.
4.1.2. Geographical structure
The second dimension to be considered here is the geographical structure of the
company. At one level, this can simply be measured in terms of headquarters location.
Table 15 highlights headquarters location by local council areas. It is evident that Glasgow
and Edinburgh dominate the Scottish scene, housing over 40% of headquarters, whilst
Dundee and Aberdeen together form a second tier. The table illustrates the high level of
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Table 14
Turnover and turnover generated through property (Source: Authors’ survey of 108 property mobilising agents.)
Million pounds Number of companies
Total annual turnover Annual turnover from property
, 1 22 (20.4%) 31 (28.7%)
1–9.9 40 (37.0%) 38 (35.2%)
10–99.9 17 (15.7%) 13 (12.0%)
. 100 11 (10.2%) 6 (5.6%)
Missing 18 (16.7%) 20 (18.5%)
Scottish headquarters amongst the property mobilising agents. Seventy eight per cent of
headquarters are found here.
Beyond company headquarters location, it is also instructive to examine the geographi-
cal distribution of companies’ property business and, in particular, to gauge the extent to
which companies are more or less dependent on the Scottish market. In the survey, all
firms were asked to indicate the proportion of their turnover generated through property
business within Scotland, and the proportion of staff involved in property business who
were located in Scotland. Since both displayed identical trends, only the proportion of
‘property’ staff located in Scotland will be cited here. The picture which emerges is of a
polarised, geographical structure. A significant majority of companies (67 of the 108)
employ their entire property-related staff in Scotland and a further 9 had between 80%
and 99% here. For the bulk of the sample, therefore, there exists high levels of dependency
on the Scottish property market. On the other hand, however, one quarter of companies
(28) had fewer than half their property employees in Scotland and were, thus, considerably
less dependent on their Scottish operations.
This picture of dependence can be elaborated on by shifting to a more local scale of
analysis. Table 16 portrays the dispersion of company operations across Scotland. One
quarter of the property mobilising agents are locally dependent; in the sense that their
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Table 15
Location of company headquarters (Source: author’s survey of 108 property mobilising agents.)
Local authority area Number and proportion of companies





Other districts with 2–4 HQsa 20 18.5%




a Local authority areas of Aberdeenshire, Ayr, Falkirk, Fife, Kincardine and Deeside, Midlothian, North
Lanarkshire, and Scottish Borders.
b Local authority areas of Clackmannanshire, Dumfries and Galloway, East Dunbartonshire, Inverclyde, High-
land, Renfrewshire, South Lanarkshire, and West Lothian.
Table 16










entire operations are confined to a single local council area. Three quarters of those
companies responding to the survey had property operations in more than one local
council, with 19 operating in up to 10 councils and a further 6 active in 11–15 council
areas. Thus whilst there may indeed be considerable dependency on Scottish operations,
for most property agents within Scotland their dependency is not restricted to one council
area.
4.1.3. Nature of activity
A key criteria which can be employed to distinguish firms is the nature of their involve-
ment in the mobilisation of capital. Firms were asked to provide self-definitions of their
involvement in property. Of primary interest here is the way in which all firms tended
classify themselves into one of three categories: investors, developers, or investors and
developers. Whilst these categories were not included in the questionnaire and therefore
are not based upon our own a priori assumptions, to the companies these distinctions
appeared to be clear cut and all sought to locate themselves into one of the three groups.
Whilst investors were primarily finance companies investing in the built environment as
part of an asset portfolio, developers were defined as companies exclusively interested in
building property for sale or rent in the short term. Whilst investors more often deployed
their own capital, developers activities were shaped by their capacity to mobilise capital
(from all over the financial markets) as part of speculative developments. Investors and
developers were perceived as companies who engaged in both activities. Of the 108
companies responding to the survey, 23 (21%) were investors only, 47 (44%) defined
themselves as both developers and investors, whilst 38 (35%) defined themselves as
developers only. Aside from performing these core roles, many companies indicated
that they had further interests in property; one company indicating that they performed
five additional roles (landlord, lessor, marketing agent, solicitors, and factor). There
appeared to be no systematic tendency, however, for firms in any one category to be
more or less likely to perform additional functions. Given that these three categories
emerged from the companies’ self descriptions, and that they, therefore, seem to constitute
their core identities, they mark out an important division—one that we will return to
Chapter 4.4.
It will be recalled from Fig. 5 that irrespective of the nature of the work they do, firms
might also be located more generally within the overall property development process.
Four categories of role were specified in Fig. 5: developers, land owners, property owners,
and property financiers. From the information provided by the survey, it proved impossible
to classify all 108 companies accurately into one of these four roles. We, therefore, have
no overall picture of the relative importance of each. As Table 17 illustrates, it is clear
nonetheless that all four were represented in the sample at some level.
4.2. The importance of local political activity
In this section we address the extent to which contacts exist between property mobilis-
ing agents and different tiers of the state. Particularly, our concern is with the relative
importance of local level political activity in comparison to political behaviour at larger
geographical scales. In the survey, respondents were asked at which levels of government
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they had voiced their viewpoints on any government policy or initiative. The options
provided were the local council, LECs, the Scottish Office, national UK government
and the EU, with multiple responses to these options being possible.
Table 18 illustrates the different tiers and the number of property companies which
engaged with each. Of the 108 respondents, 73.1% replied that they had contacted at least
one tier of government. The pattern across the tiers is intriguing. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
given the acknowledged patterns of state-business relations noted in previous studies, the
vast majority of those companies which have contacted the state—70 of the 79 respon-
dents—did so at the local council level. At each of the higher tiers of the state, there was a
marked decline progressively in the number of companies contacting that level of the state
to a point where only 3 contacted the European Union. Furthermore, there was a low level
of contact with national government (19 respondents) and even at the Scottish Office level
fewer than 1 in 5 companies had responded to initiatives and policies.
What conclusions can be reached from this table as to the level of politicisation of
property mobilising agents? At one level these agents must be regarded as being politically
active, since nearly three-quarters had made representations to government. What this data
does not show, however, is the qualitative aspects of this contact; in particular the strength,
depth and direction of this activity. At a second level, it is evident that the local level does
dominate political activity and most noticeably that local councils form the key object of
company’s actions. To the extent that one can take these patterns as testimony of genuine
political lobbying, it would seem that it is indeed at the urban level in Scotland that most
attention needs to be given by research.
Whilst Table 18 provides a sense of the differential rates of engagement with the state, it
was clear that many companies contacted government at more than one tier, with poten-
tially different and complex patterns of engagement existing. Do these patterns therefore
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Table 17









Alba Homes Aberdeen Harbour Board Grosvenor Developments Barclays Group Property
Bell Properties Ltd Birkby plc Malcolm Campbell Ltd Britannia Investment
Management Ltd
James Keiler Estates Buccleugh Estates Scotmid Coop CIS Ltd
Table 18
Tiers of political activity by property mobilising agents (Source: authors’ survey.)
Tier of government Number of companies engaging
Local council 70





undermine the claim that the urban setting is the most fundamental arena for political
activity amongst property mobilising agents? In fact, as Fig. 6 illustrates, a number of clear
trends can be identified which further consolidate the pre-eminence of the local scale.
First, of the 79 companies who have engaged with the state, only 6 have done so
exclusively at tiers beyond the urban level. These are clearly players whose activities
bring them into contact with state responsibilities exercised at a more national level.
Second, 45 companies’ engagement with the state is exclusively at the local level, either
through the councils or the LECs alone, or through a combination of these bodies. Further-
more, even among the remaining 28 companies who do make contact with Scottish, British
and European levels of government, they too all have contact with the local state, with 16
having engaged with both local councils and LECs. When the profile of individual
company activity is tracked across the tiers of the hierarchy (Fig. 6) therefore, it is
impossible not to conclude that the institutions of urban governance in Scotland remain
at the forefront of property politics.
One remaining question raised by Fig. 6, however, centres on those companies who
have not made contact with either the local council or the LEC. Under what circumstances
in other words are the agencies of urban governance rendered unimportant by mobilising
agents. As part of the survey, the views of those companies not expressing their concerns
to councils or LECs—and there were 38 and 79 respondents respectively in this
category—were sought to offer insights into their inertia in undertaking political action.
Each respondent was requested to indicate which of five options best described their
position with regard to the local council/LEC’s policies and initiatives. These options
ranged from ‘few issues of the council/LEC affecting the company’ to ‘having too little
time to engage with local politics’. Multiple responses were allowed and some made use of
this possibility. The first column of Table 19 illustrates the range of responses in relation to
the local councils with the range of options for the LECs being compared in Table 20.
Tables 19 and 20 illustrate that for most respondents a single reason existed for their
non-engagement with local councils and LECs, as shown on the leading diagonals. The
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None Council LEC Scottish Office UK EU
29 70 ¾¾¾¾fi 26 ¾¾¾¾fi 10 ¾¾¾¾fi 5 ¾¾¾¾fi 2
‰
Œ ¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾fi 14 ¾¾¾¾fi 5 ¾¾¾¾fi 1
‰




¾¾¾¾fi = of which engaged with
Fig. 6. Tracking contact with tiers of government.
final column of these tables summarises the total number of companies citing each of the
optional responses. Taken together, these data point to three major conclusions. In the case
of both the local councils and the LECs, firstly, options A and E predominate, indicating
that irrelevance and apathy explain the lack of engagement at this tier. Secondly, however,
in the case of the LECs, companies complained that it is ignorance of the LECs policies
and initiatives (option B) which has led to their non-involvement. Finally, it is clear that it
is not a perception on behalf of companies that local politics is impermeable to influence
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Table 19
Reasons for not engaging with local councils (Source: authors’ survey.)
Range of options A B C D E Total
A—there are few council issues affecting the
company
7 1 1 0 3 13
B—the company is provided with insufficient
information on council policies and initiatives
3 2 0 1 8
C—the company has no appropriate channels
of communication to voice its opinions
2 0 1 6
D—there is no point anyway since council
policy is too remote and inaccessible to
influence
2 0 3
E—the company is simply too busy to get
formally involved with politics at the local
level
8 14
Other responses: A 1 B 1 D 1 E  1
No response  6
Total number of companies 38
Table 20
Reasons for not engaging with Local Enterprise Companies (Source: authors’ survey.)
Range of options A B C D E Total
A—there are few LEC issues affecting the
company
17 0 0 0 4 24
B—the company is provided with insufficient
information on LEC policies and initiatives
15 3 1 0 26
C—the company has no appropriate channels
of communication to voice its opinions
3 1 0 13
D—there is no point anyway since LEC policy
is too remote and inaccessible to influence
5 0 11
E—the company is simply too busy to get




A 1 B 1 C  2 A 1 B 1 D 1 E  1 B 1 C 1 D  2 B 1 C 1 E  1 B 1 C 1 D 1 E  1
No response 12
Total number of companies 79
that lead to them opting out of the political process at the local level. What this part of the
survey indicates is that amongst property mobilising agents, there is not only a high degree
of political action and that much of this is at the local level, but also that the openness of
the local political arena to influence is not a perceived barrier.
In summary then, the pattern which emerges in relation to the first research question is
of a moderately politicised fraction of capital. Of the 108 companies included in the
survey, 79 (73.1%) had ‘voiced their viewpoint on any government policy and initiative’.
Perhaps most significant was the very high concentration of such political activity at the
local level with more than 9 out of 10 companies who politicked addressing viewpoints at
this level. Particularly, contact with local government remains predominant with most
companies being involved with the local council. On the other hand, approximately 40%
of companies had politicked beyond this level, engaging with more than one tier of
government, although the proportion engaging beyond two tiers was limited to fewer
than 14%. We conclude from this pattern that property mobilising agents are indeed active
in lobbying at the local level in Scotland. In this respect, at least, there are intriguing
parallels with the evidence from the US where just such local concentration of political
action is evident.
4.3. Channels used in promoting company viewpoints
There currently exist three literatures which are in their own ways attempting to yield
insights into the mechanisms through which business represents itself to the state. In the
North American context, as noted in Chapter 1, the concept of growth machines has been
deployed to capture the range of informal alliances which are developing within business
communities in North American cities (Logan and Molotch, 1987). In the British context
meanwhile, most attention has been given to the ways in which the rise of local quangos
are serving to bypass older established channels of business representation. In this case,
local coalitions of maverick capital are supposedly displacing older forms of corporate
capital (Peck, 1995). Finally, as lobbying has steadily become a commodity some research
points to the rise of private sector lobby consultants as new channels for influencing the
state (Baggot, 1995). Despite these literatures, little is known of the specific channels
employed by the property sector to express property-related views to the state. Conse-
quently as part of our survey, companies were asked to identify the range of channels they
employed when expressing their viewpoints to government.
Table 21 illustrates the overall pattern of bodies utilised by those property mobilising
agents comprising the sample. Each respondent was offered a list of 12 bodies, identified
to represent key players under four sub-groups: government bodies, semi-government
bodies, including quangos; private sector lobby groups; and special interest lobby groups
in the private sector. Each respondent was also asked to indicate if they had been involved
in direct or personal contact with government, had used informal property groups of
companies, or other channels outside of this list. Nearly 1 in 4 of the companies had
never used channels to lobby government.
Amongst the 82 companies which had deployed at least one channel to access govern-
ment, four major conclusions can be drawn. First, unlike the situation in the United States
the spontaneous formation of loose groupings of property companies do not exist in
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Scotland, with less than 10% claiming that to be part of such informal groupings.
Certainly, a reasonable proportion of companies (31.5%) have individually taken it
upon themselves to make contact with government, but this as close as our data comes
to mimicking the North American experience. Second, whilst Peck (1995) argues that
there is a sidelining of traditional corporatist interest groups, in relation to the property
sector in Scotland in fact there remains evidence of these groups continuing to play an
important role in the representation of property interests. For example, the Royal
Institution of Chartered Surveyors, the British Property Federation, and the Chambers
of Commerce have all been deployed by about 1 in 5 companies. Third, and in contrast
to the claim that lobbying is now emerging as a core producer service provided by
management consultants, it is intriguing to note that only two companies indicated
that they had hired such firms in accessing government. This suggests a low level of
penetration of such organisations into the Scottish property arena.
For us, the most important conclusion, however, is the fact that the state is itself not only
an object of lobbying but is also a resource which companies attempt to employ in the
promotion of their viewpoint. In other words, local councillors, MPs, MEPs, different
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Table 21
Channels of contact with the state (Notes: Other categories provided by respondents. 1. Scottish Homes (1
respondent); 2. Association of British Insurers (2); 3. Industrial Property Federation (2), British Ports Association
(1), SBEF (1), Transport Liaison Forum (1), West End Landowners Association (1), NHBC (1), local architect
(1), London-based consultancy (1). Source: authors’ survey.)
Group Bodies Number of companies % of sample
Government bodies 62 57.4
Local council/councillor 57 52.8
Scottish Office 23 37.1
MP/Westminster 24 22.2
MEP/European Parliament 2 3.2
Semi-Government bodies 37 34.3
Scottish Enterprise 19 17.6
Local Enterprise Company 32 29.7
Other groups *1 1 0.9
Private sector lobby groups 37 34.3
RICS 22 20.4
CBI 7 6.5
Chambers of commerce 18 16.7
Others *2 3 2.8
Specialist private sector groups 32 29.6
British Property Federation 20 18.5
Building Societies Association 0 0
Building Federation 8 7.4




Informal grouping of property
companies
10 9.3
Never used channels to contact
government
26 24.1
departments and indeed different tiers of government become enlisted in this process as
advocates of businesses’ agendas. In so doing, property companies continue to place most
emphasis on traditional state bodies, such as the local council. Whilst the local quangoc-
racy, therefore, has been designed specifically to channel the voices of business to the rest
of government, it would appear that this role plays second fiddle to the traditional arms of
the state. If there is a learning curve to the use of Scottish Enterprise and LECs specifically
as instruments for the promotion of business agendas, it seems that property mobilising
agents remain near the bottom of the curve.
The pattern of different combinations of channels employed by companies provide
a further insight. Amongst those companies who did employ channels, the majority
deemed one route insufficient in ensuring that their viewpoint was promoted. Indeed,
68 companies employed at least 2 of the 12 channels noted in Table 21, with
several using as many as 9 or 11 different channels (Table 22). This would suggest
once more that property mobilising agents display a reasonable degree of politicisa-
tion. Moreover, of the 80 companies who did engage with at least one of the four
groups of channels shown in Table 21—that is, did not use personal/direct or
informal groups to express views—the majority voiced their viewpoints through
more than one group, with 26 using channels crossing two groups, and a further
22 crossing three. Indeed 6 respondents indicated that their company had raised
issues using all four groups—ie. Government bodies, semi-government bodies,
private sector interest groups, and specialist lobby bodies.
In summary, what these two tables establish is that, whilst the literature tends to force
analysis down the line of privileging one channel above others, property mobilising agents
in urban Scotland remain active in using a diverse range of different groups of channels
and an array of more specific mechanisms therein. To focus, therefore, on only one type of
conduit to the state would be to miss one key dimension of the landscape of property
politics. However, to the extent that any one channel does seem to be most important, these
tables also suggest that the literature is in danger of being blind to the role of the state itself
in articulating business agendas. Perhaps against expectation, it is those traditional state
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Table 22
Diversity of channels for contact with state (Source: authors’ survey.)













institutions (particularly local councils) which emerge not only as the object of political
action but also as the vehicle.
4.4. Variations in levels of political activity
Taken together the above two sections offer an insight into the levels of property
politicking in Scotland. The third research questions posed here inquires as to whether
there are important variations between property mobilising agents in terms of their propen-
sity to engage with the state. Are there any differences, for instance, discernible along the
lines of the company characteristics outlined at the start of this chapter? To address this
question, we have brought together the number of tiers at which companies are active and
the number of different channels which they employ to provide an overall measure of their
level of involvement in property politics. Fig. 7 illustrates this pattern by plotting these two
indicators. This figure equates high levels of political action with the dispersion of such
action across the political landscape of government and lobby organisations. It is
important to note that it does, therefore, point to the intensity of action, which might be
concentrated at one scale of government or through one channel; a point which we return
to in the following discussions and which can be illuminated better through consideration
of the issues on which politicking takes place. What emerges here is a five-fold division of
political activity which can be represented as one ranging from non-activists through
those with low levels of activity to the most politically active members of the property
community.
It would be possible to cross-tabulate companies in each of the five categories defined in
Fig. 7 with those characteristics outlined at the start of the chapter, but here we choose to
focus on the extremes. Fig. 7 points to one in five of the mobilising agents having no
contact with any tier of government or using any channel to express their views. These 23
companies have a significantly greater tendency to be small to medium size companies
(that is, those with turnover between £1 million and £10 million) and whose property
operations form the bulk of their turnover. Further, all but two in this group are parent
companies. In comparison with the sample population as a whole, there was also a
tendency for investor-developers to be under-represented with a corresponding higher
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Conduits to the stateTiers
of state 0 1 or 2 3 or 4 5 +
0 23 5 1 0
1 2 17 12 4
2 or 3 1 6 16 15
4 or 5 0 2 0 4
Fig. 7. Levels of political action.
proportion of investors. In terms of the geographical distribution of property interests,
more than one third had confined their operations to a single council area.
At the other end of the scale, the 19 companies most active in terms of both the number
of tiers of government and the channels they use to express their viewpoints have a
different profile. As Table 23 below portrays, compared with the sample population as a
whole, this group consists of firms more likely to be: subsidiaries, have larger total turn-
over and property turnover, and have operations dispersed across a range of local council
areas. Nearly 90% of this group operate in two or more council areas, and indeed many
more cover more than 10 council areas. These larger, less locally dependent companies
also tend to fall into the investor-developer category, with an under-representation of
investors.
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Table 23
Characteristics of the Most Politically Active Group (Source: authors’ survey. Note: ‘no response’ not presented;
proportions may not add up to 100%.)




Parent organisation 69.4 57.9
Subsidiary 30.6 42.1
Company size: annual company turnover
, £1 million 20.4 10.5
£1–£9.9 million 37.0 36.8
£10–£99.9 million 25.9 26.3
£100 1 million 10.2 15.8
Annual company turnover in property
, £1 million 28.7 10.5
£1—£9.9 million 35.2 42.1
£10—£99.9 million 12.0 26.3
£100 1 million 5.6 10.5









Number of companies 108 19
a See text for definition.
b See Chapter 4.1.3 for definitions of nature activity.
In interpreting Fig. 7 some caution is necessary. Whilst we have suggested that there is a
discernible tendency for those mobilising agents most politically active to have different
characteristics in terms of company size, structure, operations and nature of activity from
the rest of the sample, it is of course open to debate whether these criteria represent the best
means of distinguishing companies in this context. Equally, measuring levels of political
activity in terms of tiers and channels could be challenged as the most appropriate method.
But to the extent that there are useful conclusions to be drawn from the data, it would
appear that:
† subsidiaries to a greater extent than parent companies are most politically active;
† the largest companies in the sample were the most politically active;
† the least active players tend to operate in only one council area, whilst those most active
are more geographically spread and indeed often very spatially diverse in their
operations;
† investor-developers tend to be amongst the most politically active, whereas investors
tend to be amongst the least active.
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of these conclusions is the fact that subsidiary
companies tended to more active than parents. This is surprising given that parents repre-
sent the decision-making core of companies and, therefore, any political action might be
anticipated to come through them. One reading of this position would be to suggest that
where parents are involved they are strategic in their engagement with the state, employing
only a few channels and often limited to only one tier. Alternatively, it could be argued
that subsidiaries are the foot soldiers of parent companies and, therefore, perform the
politicking roles on behalf of their organisation. In contrast, it is unsurprising that larger
companies, investor-developers, and those companies who are more geographically
dispersed in their operation are the most politically active. Each of these groups could
be anticipated to have reasons to engage across a range of state–property interfaces by
virtue of their very roles and functions.
4.5. Post-Fordist forms of urban governance and the shaping of property politics
Chapter 2 was dedicated to an analysis of the extent to which the governance of urban
Scotland can be said to have undergone a transition. Borrowing from regulationalist
inspired analysis, that chapter examined the contention that there has been a demise of
the traditional role of the local state in the Keynesian welfare model and a rise of new,
post-Fordist structures and strategies. Using seven of the key state–property interfaces
identified in Chapter 1 (Table 1) it was argued that whilst elements of the post-Fordist
model can certainly be detected in urban Scotland, there is less support for the claim of a
wholesale transition. In this section, in an effort to address the fourth research question, we
wish to use our survey to examine the extent to which the partial transition to post-Fordism
reported in Chapter 2 has served to reshape the policy areas around which property politics
concentrates. To this end, as part of the survey, respondents were asked to provide key
details about their relationships with local councils and LECs. In each case, respondents
were asked to specify their practices and experiences of engagement with these two
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groups. Specifically, they were asked to identify any policy or initiative by the council/
LEC which they felt had affected the performance of their company; and to provide details
of the specific councils/LECs and policies/initiatives to which and on which they had made
representations.
Before outlining company responses to these two questions, it is worthwhile pausing to
reflect upon what the results already outlined (Sections 4.2–4.4) can offer in this respect.
One key aspect of the transition to post-Fordism is the notion that the democratic local
state is becoming bypassed by private-sector led local quango bodies, who now serve as
both the object and vehicle for business interests in the city. As many commentators have
noted (e.g. Keating, 1991; Imrie et al., 1995; Peck and Tickell, 1995) the emergence of
centrally appointed and directed agencies have marked out one element of the new forms
of governance in Britain. What is clear from the survey evidence presented above,
however, is that at least in regard to property mobilising agents, there appears to be a
lower level of engagement with such bodies than with the more traditional loci of power,
the local councils. Not only do nearly twice as many companies contact councils as LECs,
but almost all of those who express views to the LECs also contacted councils. Further,
councils function as conduits of business agendas to a far greater degree than LECs. Not
only, therefore, are local councils more important as objects of politicking but so too they
emerge as more significant channels to other branches of the state. There is little evidence
of a diminution of the role of the local council in property politics. Whilst it is not possible
to postulate a definitive reading at this point, we would advocate the view that the rise of a
new institutional landscape in urban Scotland has not as yet served to dislodge the tradi-
tional shape of property politics and the pre-eminence of the local council. In other words,
at least at this level, there is no evidence to suggest that the rise of post-Fordist structures
of governance has fundamentally reshaped the canvas on which property politics is played
out.
Of course, this analysis is insufficient to assess properly the full extent to which such
reshaping has occurred. In the survey, firms we asked, therefore, to identify the specific
policies and initiatives undertaken by councils and LECs which they considered impinged
on their company’s performance. Using the 12-fold typology of state/property interfaces
developed in Chapter 1, we attempt to classify below the responses to these questions
(Table 24). This categorisation, in conjunction with qualitative insights provided by
companies regarding the nature of their concerns, helps us to go further in assessing the
extent to which patterns of property politics have been reshaped by the shift to post-Fordist
urban governance.
4.5.1. Relations to local councils
Of the 108 respondents, 61 identified issues and initiatives from the councils which in
their opinion impinged on their company’s performance in the property sector. The second
column of Table 24 shows the range and frequency of issues which were raised by
respondents about policies emanating from the local council. For the majority of
companies concerns lay within the realm of local planning decisions, with 40 of the 68
issues raised being in this category. In contrast far fewer respondents indicated concern
about other categories such as subsidies and regional partnerships, state investment in
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infrastructure, and fiscal policies. And, indeed, none expressed concerns on half of the
interfaces noted.
In regard to planning issues, most of the queries revolved around planning applications,
or specific property developments and reflected either disappointment with the outcomes
of planning decisions or concerns about specific policies, such as greenbelts and listed
building consent. The majority of planning issues, therefore, reflected a concern on behalf
of the companies regarding the restrictions placed upon development by planning regu-
lations. Perhaps surprisingly, given the limited powers of local councils, there were also
comments on the costs to business of the failure to collect council taxes, the impacts of
rates relief policy and (in one case) the level of interest rates. This suggests that whilst
removed from the real sources of power to shape fiscal policy, the local state is still the
recipient of complaints in areas in which it has minor discretion. Further, some companies
mentioned the ideological position of councils; reflected in their general attitudes to
property. One company based in Aberdeenshire commented on the “lack of initiative
and apathy on the part of Council employees” which had affected their performance,
whilst another typified their concerns as “all adverse and extremely numerous”. Other
sets of comments were in effect appeals for action by councils to address infrastructural
issues, and these ranged from parking (4 mentions) through shopping and retail develop-
ments to land regeneration requirements.
Other companies were concerned about the tilting of market conditions through
subsidies and local partnerships between the council and property agents. As one
company, based in Alloa noted, “the partnerships of [named] council and [named]
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Table 24
Number of respondents expressing concern over local state policies/initiatives (Notes: multiple responses
possible by the 61 respondents on council policies and 33 on LECs. Italicised state/property interfaces refer to
those discussed in Chapter 2. Source: authors’ survey.)
Type of relation Local council Local enterprise company
Structures of governance
Constitutional and legislative arrangements 0 0
Direct intervention in market
Subsidies and regional partnerships 10 13
Land and property ownership by the state 1 3
Occupier and tenant 0 0
Indirect market intervention
State investment in infrastructure 7 7
Inward investment strategies 0 2
Regulating property market operations
Fiscal policies 5 0
Protection of private property 0 0
Regulation of legal system of the property market 0 0
Legislation on design and land-use planning 40 1
Ideological stance
Place marketing and external postures 0 1
Political culture and internal attitudes 2 6
Investments [a large, English based investment company] in Central Business Parks with
[named] Construction [a larger, Scottish based constructor] are worrying in that large
amounts of public money and effort are put into these projects at the expense of existing
investors like ourselves”. Whilst all of these are indicative of tensions between agent’s
roles in the property development process and the activities of the state, as Table 24
indicates only one company offered comments on the tensions which exist between the
private sector and the role of council as a property owner. Based in Glasgow, this company
commented that “the local council (with LEC) have set up directly in competition thus
making local market conditions very difficult for us”.
4.5.2. Relations to local enterprise companies
Consistent with the patterns of lower levels of contact with the LECs noted above, far fewer
respondents had opinions to express about LEC policies and attitudes. Only 33 (30.6%)
companies indicated that LEC policies or initiatives had implications for their performance
in the property sector. As the final column of Table 24 portrays, the majority of concerns were
related to specific infrastructural investments by the LECs, the overall policy and ideological
stance of the LECs, or the availability of grants and funding opportunities.
Most of the engagements were of one of two types. At one level, companies politicked
LECs less from the perspective of critiquing their intervention in the market and more
from the point of obtaining assistance for themselves. For example, LECs were
approached about the upgrading of adjacent properties, plans for site development such
as the Glasgow waterfront, or about possible joint developments or initiatives, and some
companies noted more generally that their involvement with LECs derived from the fact
that the LECs were making “investment in physical business infrastructure [which] has
helped [the] local economy”. A second group of responses related to contacts about
financial assistance and grants. Discussions about “local investment funding”, “financial
support to new business and foreign inward investment in Ayrshire” and “assistance with
leg-up and environmental grants” typify the range of comments from this group. Together
a total of 20 of the 33 areas of concern were of this type.
On the other hand, in connection with issues relating to the ideological stance of the
LECs and their actions in intervening in the market-place, commentaries tended to be
decidedly more negative. Of the six companies who noted such issues, only two were
perhaps more ‘neutral’ merely noting that they had made contact with the LEC on these
issues. More typically, however, were views which represented hostility to the ways in
which LECs had influenced market conditions, such as:
“The change in Scottish Enterprise/LEC strategy towards support for major inward
investment, away from start-ups and SMES (locally) has and will impact adversely
on our ability to expand our provision of small business premises locally.”
“Enterprise companies have offered prospective tenants very cheap uncompetitive rent
on industrial units.”
“If Scottish Enterprise Tayside (SET) own the land or property themselves we cannot
compete with the private sector. New councils and SET want to come together to
promote their own interests first.”
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One company based in Glasgow with local interests in a part of the city in which the
Glasgow Development Agency (GDA) had been active, indicated that the GDA’s lack of
effective communication impeded relations: “failure of LEC and the Govan Initiative
which it supports to consent or communicate with our company on their new involvement
in the local commercial property market is a problem”. Another respondent summarised
their view of the LECs attitude to the private property sector thus; “contacts within LECs
as to what they can do for the private sector are very poor—a lot of talking not much
action—endless useless statistical reports”.
4.5.3. Interpreting company viewpoints
From the evidence collected in the survey, we conclude that to the extent that there has
been a shift towards post-Fordist urban governance in Scotland, this has not triggered off a
corresponding shift in the morphology of property politics. Our results demonstrate the
apparent inertia of property mobilising agents in responding to the new opportunities that
are being provided to them. It would seem at both the level of the new structures and new
practices of governance that a low level of political consciousness prevails. We argue this
for two reasons. First, political activity continues to centre on the democratic local state.
Furthermore, concerns are primarily registered with the more traditional roles of the
state. Despite the rise to prominence of a more entrepreneurial style of governance, the
most fundamental concerns of property mobilising agents continue to revolve around
planning restrictions and the distorting effects of the local council on the property market.
Even when politicking LECs, these agents fail to engage with issues beyond those of
market intervention and regulation. Far from embracing the new ‘enabling state’ property
politics continues to focus on what can be characterised as very traditional interfaces with
the state.
Second, what is perhaps even more intriguing are those gaps in the current landscape of
property politics of urban Scotland. Returning to the debates reviewed at the start of this
paper, we find it remarkable that given all that is going around them, property mobilising
agents would seem to be singularly disinterested in adjusting to new agendas. For instance,
it is incredible that amongst the firms surveyed none had been actively politicking in
regard to the constitutional arrangements behind LECs, the privatisation of public
property, and the issues surrounding the Private Finance Initiative. Further, very few
had taken action in relation to the provision of pump priming by the state, state investment
in infrastructure, and inward investment strategies. Finally, in regard to planning issues, it
was also clear that companies complaints were largely restricted to specific planning
issues and there was no engagement with wider debates about the need to change the
architecture and practices of the Scottish planning system.
Despite arguing earlier that the property mobilising agents making up this survey
demonstrated a reasonable degree of politicisation, particularly at the local level, a
fuller assessment of the nature of local political behaviour would appear to suggest
otherwise. This particular cohort of capital may well be active in engaging with the
state, but they are failing to appreciate the rapidly changing context within which they
are working, have developed no coherent strategies in relation to policy changes, and
are failing to step away from a focus on daily, personal concerns to engage with the
more philosophical debates which are shaping their future. From the evidence we have
R. Rogerson, M. Boyle / Progress in Planning 54 (2000) 133–196 191
presented, we would conclude, therefore, that the rise of post-Fordist forms of urban
governance has not stamped its imprint on the nature of property politics in Scottish
cities. It would seem that whatever the agendas of the state, the property sector
occupies a different trajectory.
4.6. Conclusion
The empirical analysis of the political activities of the leading property capitals within
major Scottish cities presented here is amenable to different levels of interpretation. We
leave the wider implications to the next chapter, and concentrate here on summarising
what we see as being the most immediate points to arise. On the face of it, in Scotland,
property mobilising agents appear to be reasonably politically active. Their activities tend
to be directed towards and indeed through local arms of the state, and especially the local
council. The issues upon which they take such action, however, have greater affinity with
the realms of what can be taken to be an older, more traditional tapestry of local govern-
ance. Their concerns, whether expressed to councils or in fact to the LECs, continue to
emphasise a sense of immediacy in their political agendas. Further, they seem to be
unaware of the significant transformations in the political canvas which is being woven
around them. In Chapter 2 it was argued that property politics has to be located within the
context of maelstrom of change. Either property mobilising agents have consciously or
unconsciously decided that there is nothing in this change of interest, or they are cogni-
tively overwhelmed by it.
In these respects, there is a conflicting picture emerging. On the one hand, the relatively
high levels of engagement with, and wide use of many conduits to, the state appear to suggest
a level of political maturity more typically identified with the business community in North
American cities. On the other hand, framed within a backdrop of neo-liberal state reform, a
closer examination of the nature of the state–property interfaces on which firms engage most,
points to a less politically conscious fraction of capital. Given the new opportunities for
political action, which now exist within this frame, the concerns of property mobilising
agents appear oddly anachronistic. Whilst it might be too strong to characterise these agents
as ‘political dinosaurs’, it would certainly be fair to typify their political ambitious as
blinkered. In this respect, therefore, property mobilising agents in Scotland might be said
to display characteristics which have, indeed, often been attributed to British capital.
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CHAPTER 5
Moving beyond state-centred perspectives
The research design adopted in this paper marks out an important new direction in the
study of business politics in the city. By choosing to focus on one fraction of capital and
the political activities of this fraction across a range of different cities within one political
system, we have moved beyond existing work that has tended to be state-centred. The
patterns of property politics we have revealed can best be characterised as anachronistic,
not only in the issues which are pursued, but also in the institutions which are targeted and
the channels employed. Thus, despite the maelstrom of change in state structures and
strategies in urban Scotland, property politics still bears the hallmarks of a previous era.
Only by designing the research in this way has the apparent disinterest of capital in
engaging with the new agendas of the state become apparent.
This said, we wish to conclude by noting that whilst we have adopted a more capital-
centred approach than hitherto, it is still necessary for future research to theorise yet
further the extent to which property politics reflect the changing trajectories of capital
more than the state’s. In exploring property politics as a set of interfaces between capital
and state, as shown in Table 1, we could ourselves be criticised for considering only
interfaces which reflect functions and activities of the state. A key question which, there-
fore, remains unasked and unanswered, is what would the property political scene look
like if the focus were shifted to the agendas of property agents? It is likely that the
interfaces which would be of concern in this instance would either be different from
those considered in Table 1, or reflect different readings of the interfaces shown.
By shifting the entry point of analysis of business political activity more towards
capital, we are advocating the need for a greater theorisation of the role of different
regimes of accumulation rather than modes of regulation in the construction of the agendas
around which politicking takes place. In the specific case of property, for instance, we
would argue that future research needs to pay greater attention to the location of property
mobilising agents within wider accumulation processes. At a theoretical level, it is clear
that cycles of development of the built environment can be related to the rhythms of capital
accumulation. For example, more use could be made of David Harvey’s analyses of the
ways in which capital is switched from the primary circuit of production–consumption
relations into the built environment, and the more recent research which has suggested a
more complex set of relations between capital entering into property development and the
wider economy. In particular, with the growing acceptance that there is greater autonomy
of the financial circuit from other circuits of capital, there exists new patterns of differ-
entiation in the capitals brought to bear on property development. There is thus a need to
examine, more intimately, the impact of such different forms of capital on the process of
property-state politics.
If, for instance, the source of capital exists within the primary circuit, most obviously as
owner–occupier capital, or is sourced through key elements of the primary circuit (the
owner–occupier leveraging capital for property development) then relations with the state
might be dominated by local and specific issues associated with individual property
developments. On the other hand, if the capital invested in property arises from a crisis
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of accumulation, as Harvey (1982, 1985) argues, then the range of intersections with the
state may be different, drawing perhaps on a wider range of faces which impact on
investment returns. Further, if the source of capital is in the finance circuit then issues
relating to fiscal policy, interest rates and other monetary concerns might arguably domi-
nate the political agendas of such property agents. The key point we are making, therefore,
is that the morphology of property politics in the city might well reflect the environments
of capital rather than those of the state.
In conclusion, we would encourage future research which attempts to theorise the
empirical findings contained in this paper to address the following issues:
† what are the origins of capital; that is, from which circuits does capital derive?
† what are the institutional arrangements through which capital is grounded in particular
spaces?
† in what ways do the relationships between capital and its intermediaries shape the
capacity of these intermediaries to engage with the state?
In other words, in the case presented in this paper, how are the political activities of
property mobilising agents in urban Scotland both constrained and enabled by the position
of these agents within the different circuits of capital?
In order to move beyond state-centred perspectives, therefore, we are arguing that there
may be merit in rehabilitating both the neo-Marxist focus on the city as an expression of
wider capital accumulation processes and more recent literature which affords greater
attention to the details of the institutional arrangements through which capital is embedded
in certain spaces. It could be that both theoretical frameworks might profitably be married
to produce a richer account of property politics in the city.
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